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PRIVATE INSURANCE, SOCIAL INSURANCE, AND
TORT REFORM: TOWARD A NEW VISION OF
COMPENSATION FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY
Kenneth S. Abraham and Lance Liebman *
The United States does not have a system for compensating the vic-
tims of illness and injury; it has a set of different institutions that pro-
vide compensation. We rely on both tort law and giant programs of
public and private insurance to compensate the victims of illness and
injury. These institutions perform related functions, but the relation-
ships among them are far from coherent. Indeed, the institutions
sometimes work at cross-purposes, compensating some victims exces-
sively and others not at all.
The absence of a coherent system of compensation is reflected
even in suggested reforms of existing institutions. Proposals to reform
tort law' often do not recognize the role played by public and private
* Kenneth S. Abraham is Class of 1962 Professor of Law, University of Virginia
School of Law. Lance Liebman is Dean and Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
This Article had its origins in a series of background papers and chapters that the
authors prepared for the American Law Institute, Reporters' Study, Enterprise
Responsibility for Personal Injury (1991). We are grateful to our colleagues on that
project and to the Institute for their support and assistance. In addition, we thank Lynn
Baker, Saul Levmore, William Stuntz, and participants in workshops at Columbia Law
School and the University of Pennsylvania Law School for their comments on an earlier
draft.
1. Some reform advocates would do away with tort law and replace it with
insurance. See, e.g., Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its
Consequences 193-206 (1988) (advocating replacement of tort by direct insurance,
contract, and agency regulation of large-scale societal risks); Stephen D. Sugarman,
Doing Away with Personal Injury Law: New Compensation Mechanisms for Victims,
Consumers, and Business 127-48 (1989) (arguing for replacing tort system with social
insurance system and new regulatory scheme to prevent accidents). Some would extend
the reach of tort law. See, e.g., Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and
Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14J. Legal Stud. 779, 781-83 (1985) (advocating tort
liability for creation of risk of harm); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass
Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849,
866-68, 881-87 (1984) (arguing for proportionality approach to proof of causation in
mass tort litigation). Some would reorder tort law by transferring many of its
compensation and deterrence functions to other institutions and strengthening the tort
law that would remain. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and
Modem Tort Law, 96 Yale LJ. 1521, 1587-90 (1987) (calling for removal of insurance
function of tort law, leaving deterrence function only); Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort
Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 184, 190-95, 198 (1987)
(suggesting changes in allocation of functions among existing compensation
institutions). Finally, some would create methods by which victims and injurers could
elect alternatives to tort law. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault: A Fair-
Exchange Proposal for Tort Reform, in New Directions in Liability Law 186, 190-94
(Walter Olson ed., 1988) (advocating legislation allowing defendant to offer plaintiff
mandatory settlement limited to value of economic loss).
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insurance programs in compensating for health care expenses and lost
income, even though insurance programs dwarf tort law as a system of
reimbursement.2 Similarly, those who offer proposals for altered pri-
vate or public insurance protection-and many put changes in the na-
tion's system of health insurance at the top of the domestic agenda3-
usually ignore the connections between a family's insurance protection
(whether provided by government, by an employer, or by first-party
purchase) and the ill or injured victim's claims against a tortfeasor.
Moreover, insurance reform proposals often ignore a fundamental in-
sight of modern tort theory: when a system provides compensation for
expenses not previously reimbursed, the entire cost of this new com-
pensation is not an added social cost. The added cost of a new pro-
gram may, in the broader social context, merely be shifted from victims
or another program. The blindnesses of these proposals to their insti-
tutional "neighbors" are easy to explain. Because of academic and
practice specialization, many of the persons most knowledgeable and
creative about tort law know little about private and social insurance,
while insurance and social-welfare experts often know little about tort
law.
In contrast, other countries have articulated the principles that un-
2. Although more than forty states adopted tort reform legislation of some kind
during the last decade, on the whole this legislation has merely tinkered with tort law
doctrine and cannot be seen as fundamental change. The most common reforms
include placing ceilings on the amount of pain and suffering damages recoverable,
modifying the collateral source rule, and restricting the scope of joint and several
liability. For a catalogue of the measures enacted, see Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce,
"Off to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L.
Rev. 207, 217-23 (1990).
3. The prominence of the health care issue in the recent presidential election is
particularly notable. Comprehensive health care proposals have been on the U.S.
political agenda for fifty years. Currently discussed reforms range from the Republican
proposal to create tax incentives for the purchase of health insurance and to support the
creation of health insurance pools for small businesses, to proposals for Canadian-style
"national" health insurance, see U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Canadian Health
Insurance: Lessons for the United States (1991) [hereinafter Canadian Health
Insurance], to the Pepper Commission's recommendations for the institution of
"universal" health and long-term care insurance for all Americans, see U.S. Bipartisan
Comm'n on Comprehensive Health Care, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Recommendations to
the Congress: Access to Health Care and Long-Term Care for All Americans 1-3 (1990)
[hereinafter Pepper Recommendations]. In between lie a variety of proposals for the
provision of health insurance through employers or other groups, including "play or
pay" proposals that would permit employers to provide such coverage ("play") or "pay"
a tax to finance a publicly-operated insurance pool covering the residual population of
uninsured persons. See Alain C. Enthoven, Managed Competition: An Agenda for
Action, Health Aff., Summer 1988, at 25, 45; see also Alain C. Enthoven & Richard
Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s: Universal Health Insurance in
a System Designed to Promote Quality and Economy, 320 New Eng. J. Med. 29, 32
(1989) (advocating "pay or play" as part of a broader scheme to provide universal health
insurance).
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derlie their systems of injury and illness compensation. 4 Developing a
clearer sense of the principles animating the institutional arrangements
for compensation in the United States is an essential prerequisite to
creating a more coherent system of protection and to assigning proper
roles to tort law, private insurance and social insurance.5
The goal of this Article is to take the first step in this direction.
The Article seeks to expose the existing relationships among tort law
and the private and social insurance systems; to identify the gaps and
overlaps in the existing network of compensation institutions; to ana-
lyze the obstacles to the achievement of a different regime; and to indi-
cate the choices that must be made in constructing a coherent
compensation system. Our angle of attack is more analytical than
programmatic. Part I describes the "system" of compensation now in
place in the United States. Part II analyzes relationships among differ-
ent existing institutions, isolating points of tension and inconsistencies
4. For discussions of the health insurance systems of other industrialized countries,
see generally Canadian Health Insurance, supra note 3 (1991); U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office, Health Care Spending Control: The Experience of France, Germany, andJapan
(1991). For a comparative discussion of disability and other protections, see P.R. Kaim-
Caudle, Comparative Social Policy and Social Security: A Ten-Country Study 290-312
(1973). For a similar analysis of civil liability schemes, see Werner Pfennigstorf &
Donald G. Gifford, A Comparative Study of Liability Law and Compensation Schemes in
Ten Countries and the United States (1991).
5. Numerous scholars have explored the principles underlying existing institutions,
contributing to the quest for a more principled and coherent system. Charles Reich saw
that for contemporary citizens health, retirement, and disability benefits play the role
that land performed in early modern times. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73
Yale LJ. 733, 733 (1964). Others have extended the metaphor of estates in land to
positions in the modern welfare state. See Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability
in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social
Welfare Estates, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 833, 864-67 (1976).
Today, some scholars press for a comprehensive benefit system, pursuing
horizontal equity for those placed in need by harsh events. See Eli P. Bernzweig, By
Accident Not Design: The Case for Comprehensive Injury Reparations 157-62 (1980)
(proposing a statutory social insurance scheme premised on the notion of social
responsibility to accident victims). Among the most inventive in. suggesting devices for
allowing individuals to protect themselves against economic loss is Jeffrey O'Connell.
See Jeffrey O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals,
59 Va. L. Rev. 749, 773-75 (1973) (arguing for enterprise liability for injury resulting
from typical risks inherent in the enterprise's activity). All of these studies look with
interest at the comprehensive system in place in New Zealand. For a description of the
New Zealand model, see Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, Compensation for
Personal Injury in New Zealand 177-88 (1967); Geoffrey Palmer, Compensation for
Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and Australia 222-30
(1979).
Other scholars, however, are much more skeptical. They see diverse functions,
especially deterrence, being performed by the current mix of programs and worry that a
comprehensive social welfare alternative to current arrangements will generate large
costs in reduced deterrence of those who could take precautions to avoid illness and
injury. See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock, Incentive Issues in the Design of "No-Fault"
Compensation Systems, 39 U. Toronto L.J. 19, 20 (1989).
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of principle. Part III seeks to confront the problems ignored by most
current proposals for compensation reform-the obstacles to expan-
sion of the current compensation web. Part III also offers several mod-
els designed to guide thinking about the relationships among private
insurance, social insurance, and tort.
I. THE EXISTING FABRIC OF PROTECTION
The United States has no "system" of compensation for the victims
of illness and injury and has not adopted the principle that all such
victims should receive full compensation. Consequently, we have a col-
lection of different compensation programs, with gaps between and
overlaps among them, leaving many victims undercompensated and
some actually overcompensated. These different institutions employ
different criteria for determining whether the victim of illness or injury
receives benefits. Responsibility for compensation is based sometimes
on fault, sometimes on cause, and sometimes on loss. For example,
tort liability for accidental injury is generally imposed only upon proof
of the defendant's fault; workers' compensation and similar no-fault
systems pay compensation upon the occurrence of an illness or injury
that can be ascribed to a particular cause, regardless of fault; and first-
party private and social insurance cover particular occasions of loss, re-
gardless of fault or cause.
A. Fault-Based Compensation
Although certain tort law doctrines impose true strict liability,
most tort liability for illness or injury is predicated on some form of
fault on the part of the defendant. Despite the considerable attention
devoted to the subject, tort recovery is a modest compensation pro-
gram in the context of the other systems of compensation available in
the United States for the consequences of illness and injury. For exam-
ple, in 1984, tort recoveries totaled $39 billion-something over $50
billion in current dollars. 6 But this sum comprised only one-tenth of
the total paid by all systems. Moreover, this comparison ignores fed-
eral and state income maintenance programs. 7 If the sums paid by
these programs are included, the quantitative significance of tort is
even smaller. It would be foolhardy, therefore, to assess possible
changes in tort law without considering the scope of these other pro-
grams and the obstacles that stand in the way of their expansion.
B. Cause-Based Compensation
In contrast to the tort system, which pays compensation after a de-
6. See Jeffrey O'Connell & James Guinivan, An Irrational Combination: The
Relative Expansion of Liability Insurance and Contraction of Loss Insurance, 49 Ohio
St. LJ. 757, 759 (1988).
7. See id.
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termination of fault, cause-based compensation programs pay as long
as a loss arises out of or is caused by a particular activity or exposure.
Workers' compensation is the most widespread of these programs, hav-
ing been adopted in all fifty states.8 It provides roughly $30 billion in
benefits per year to workers who suffer illness or injury as a conse-
quence of employment.9 Benefits include full payment of medical costs
and a percentage of lost wages up to a specified ceiling. In addition,
workers' compensation makes lump-sum payments for designated inju-
ries (for example, loss of a limb) under the infamous "meat chart," and
pays survivors' benefits. Wage-loss and lump-sum payments comprise
about 60% of the program's expenditures.
Unlike the loss-based insurance programs discussed below, which
disburse only long-term benefits for total disability, workers' compen-
sation pays benefits for both temporary total and permanent partial dis-
ability. About three-fourths of all workers' compensation cases involve
payments for temporary total disability, but these comprise only 18%
of all the money paid as benefits. In contrast, about one-fourth of the
cases are permanent partial disability claims, which account for about
70% of all benefit payments. 10
In addition to workers' compensation, a number of other cause-
based compensation programs have been adopted in recent years. The
most prominent of these are the auto no-fault plans, adopted in four-
teen states, which pay over $2 billion annually." Two states have also
recently adopted cause-based programs to compensate the victims of
birth-related neurological injury.1 2 At the federal level, the Black Lung
Benefits Program pays approximately $1.5 billion per year,13 the Na-
tional Vaccine Injury Compensation Program is projected to pay $80
million per year,14 and Veterans' benefits for military service-related
health care and disability total over $21 billion per year.1 5
Although these different cause-based programs have no particular
relation to each other, and although Veterans' benefits are partly "wel-
fare" rather than injury or illness compensation, it is nonetheless useful
for comparative purposes to note that the total compensation that
cause-based programs pay, approximately $55 billion, is roughly equal
to the $50 billion paid by the tort system to its beneficiaries.
8. See 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 5.30, at 39 (1992).
9. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 368 (1991) [hereinafter Statistical Abstract].
10. See William J. Nelson, Jr., Workers' Compensation: 1980-84 Benchmark
Revisions, Soc. Security Bull., July 1988, at 4, 9 (figures cited are for 1982).
11. See Josephine Y. King, No Fault Automobile Accident Law 7-14 (1987);
O'Connell & Guinivan, supra note 6, at 767 n.2.
12. See Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 766.301-766.316 (West Supp. 1992); Va. Code Ann.
§§ 38.2-5000-38.2-5021 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992).
13. See Statistical Abstract, supra note 9, at 369.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(j) (1988).
15. See Statistical Abstract, supra note 9, at 93, 360.
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C. Loss-Based Compensation
Two basic forms of loss insurance provide compensation for the
economic consequences of illness and injury: private insurance and so-
cial insurance. Together the sums paid by these two sources dwarf
those paid by both the fault-based and cause-based systems of
compensation.
1. Private Insurance. - The principal forms of private loss insur-
ance provide coverage for health care expenses, income lost because of
disability, and loss of life or limb. Each form of coverage is first-party
insurance or victim's coverage, as distinguished from third-party or lia-
bility insurance which covers a party's liability as an injurer. Private
first-party health, disability, and life insurance pay approximately $220
billion annually. 16
a. Health Insurance. - Health care costs in the United States ex-
ceed $800 billion per year, and have been growing annually at a rate of
10%. 1 7 Basic private health. insurance, including Blue Cross and Blue
Shield and coverage provided by commercial carriers, covers various
combinations of physician's services, hospitalization, rehabilitation, and
nursing care. In addition, Major Medical insurance covers certain costs
above the specified limits of coverage under primary policies. To-
gether these sources of coverage pay roughly $185 billion in insurance
benefits each year.18
Sizable as these benefits are in absolute terms, more than thirty
million Americans have no private or socially provided health insur-
ance,i 9 and about one-quarter of those who are covered by health in-
surance of some sort have inadequate coverage. For example, in 1987,
16. See American Council of Life Ins., Life Insurance Fact Book Update 17 (1991)
[hereinafter Fact Book] ($24.5 billion in life insurance benefits paid in 1990); Health Ins.
Ass'n of Am., Source Book of Health Insurance Data 7 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Source
Book] ($185 billion in health insurance benefits paid in 1989); Health Ins. Ass'n of Am.,
1988 Update: Source Book of Health Insurance Data 9 (1988) [hereinafter 1988
Update] ($5.6 billion in disability insurance benefits paid in 1986). Although classifying
this coverage as "private" is a useful way to distinguish it from insurance provided
through "on-budget" governmental expenditures, in some respects the classification is
problematic. Most health and disability insurance, for example, is group coverage
provided (or offered for purchase) as a fringe benefit of employment. The terms of
coverage are regulated by a federal statute (Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)) as well as by state statutes and
regulations. The fact that such heavily regulated coverage has become so common for
middle-class wage earners and their families has important implications for the direction
in which expansions might occur. See infra part III. Thus, it is also worth recognizing
the tripartite distinction among individually purchased private insurance; heavily
regulated, "private" employer-provided insurance; and governmentally operated
"social" insurance.
17. See 1991 Source Book, supra note 16, at 7.
18. See id.
19. Congressional Research Serv., 100th Cong., 2d Sess., Health Insurance and the
Uninsured: Background Data and Analysis 93 (Comm. Print 1988).
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an estimated 15.3% of all insured families incurred health care costs
greater than 5% of their income, and 3.7% of all insured families in-
curred costs greater than 25% of their income.20 These costs included
policyholder/beneficiary contributions in the form of deductibles and
coinsurance payments and costs for services not covered under the pol-
icies or subject to lifetime benefit limitations.2 1
While these estimates provide a useful reference point, it is impor-
tant to recognize that people who have no health insurance are not nec-
essarily denied health care. Many of the uninsured are treated at public
and nonprofit hospitals, which do not collect most of the charges billed
to uninsured patients. Such hospitals then often include a portion of
these unrecovered costs in the sums for which they are reimbursed by
private health and social insurance. 22 In effect, insured patients pro-
vide partial insurance to uninsured patients; the "owners" of public
and nonprofit hospitals then absorb the remaining cost of treating the
uninsured. This system of "insuring" the uninsured, however, is far
from ideal. Public and nonprofit hospitals have an incentive either not
to treat or to under-treat the uninsured, and this incentive has its ef-
fects: people without health insurance receive less primary and preven-
tive care than those who are insured. 23
b. Disability Insurance. - Disability insurance protects the insured
party against income lost as a result of physical or mental inability to
perform his current or, in the case of some coverage, any occupation.
This form of coverage usually insures against losses caused by total dis-
ability, although some policies also cover partial disability, often simply
by providing short-term coverage for occupational disability and long-
term coverage for general disability.
Disability insurance is the least prevalent form of private loss insur-
ance. About 60 million people (roughly 55% of the workforce) are cov-
ered by private short-term disability insurance, defined as coverage
against disability lasting for less than two years; but only about 24 mil-
20. See id. at 3-4.
21. See id. In 1988, Congress attempted to address part of this problem by
enacting "catastrophic" coverage for the elderly. See Medicare Catastrophic Coverage
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683. The costs were to be borne by a tax on
relatively well-off older beneficiaries. But when the tax was imposed, taxpayers
protested, and in 1989 the program was repealed. See Medicare Catastrophic Coverage
Repeal Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103 Stat. 1979 (1989).
22. The extent of this cost-shifting is a matter of some debate, and it varies from
state to state. See Jack A. Meyer, Financing Uncompensated Care with All-Payer Rate
Regulation, in Uncompensated Hospital Care 167, 167-68 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds.,
1986).
23. See Joel Weissman & Arnold M. Epstein, Case Mix and Resource Utilization by
Uninsured Hospital Patients in the Boston Metropolitan Area, 261 JAMA 3572,
3575-76 (1989) (analysis indicating shorter lengths of stay and fewer procedures for
uninsured patients); Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Reverse Targeting of
Preventive Care Due to Lack of Health Insurance, 259 JAMA 2872, 2873-74 (1988)
(lack of insurance is strongest predictor of failure of women to receive screening tests).
1993]
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lion people (roughly 22% of the workforce) are covered by long-term
disability insurance. 24 Private disability insurance pays only about $6
billion in benefits annually. 25
c. Life Insurance. - General-purpose life insurance, whether
whole-life or term, covers death resulting from any cause; special-pur-
pose accidental death and dismemberment policies or endorsements to
general-purpose policies (for example, providing "double indemnity")
cover death or grievous bodily harm resulting from accidents. How-
ever, special-purpose policies and endorsements appear to provide so
small a percentage of total life insurance payments that they are not
even separately reported in the industry's own statistical summaries. 26
The gross amounts of life insurance in force and paid in benefits
annually are substantial. Life insurance payments to beneficiaries, as
distinguished from payments to policyholders and annuitants as some
form of return on savings, totalled $24.5 billion in 1990.27 In the same
year over $9 trillion in life insurance was in force, providing an average
of $121,000 in life insurance per insured household in the United
States. 28 Although the size of this average death benefit is more than
nominal, much of the population probably has only modest coverage at
most. On the one hand, roughly 80% of all policies, providing 64% of
all coverage, insure persons with incomes of less than $50,000 per
year.29 But on the other hand, 47% of all policies provide 72% of all
coverage.30 It seems fairly clear, therefore, that slightly less than half of
the population is protected by the vast majority of life insurance that is
in force in the United States. The other half of the population is far less
well protected.
2. Social Insurance. - Most governmentally provided "social" in-
surance against illness and injury in this country is loss-based; that is,
benefits are payable upon the occurrence of a specified form of eco-
nomic loss regardless of fault or cause.3' Each American social insur-
24. See 1988 Update, supra note 16, at 7 (statistics are for 1984 and 1986
respectively).
25. See id. at 9. By contrast, annual disability benefits paid by public programs and
workers' compensation are ten times as large: over $60 billion in 1988. See Statistical
Abstract, supra note 9, at 360.
26. See Fact Book, supra note 16.
27. See id. at 4.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 7 (1990 statistics).
30. See id.
31. There are, of course, other social insurance programs based mainly on
economic need, but typically these do not provide compensation for losses expressly
associated with illness or injury. Programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children and General Relief, while "categorical" (eligibility may require, for example,
being a single parent and engaging in efforts to find work), fall into this category. See
infra note 42 and accompanying text. Workers' compensation, which we regard as the
paradigmatic example of cause-based protection, is sometimes described as social
insurance in that government mandates and regulates such employer-paid insurance.
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ance program was designed individually to meet particular needs. As a
result, the programs taken as a whole do not reflect a clear vision of
communal responsibility for an identifiable subset of the economic risks
of modern life.
a. Health Insurance. - Medicare and Medicaid provide the lion's
share of federally supported health care insurance.3 2 In the aggregate,
these two programs pay roughly $159 billion per year for health care
provided to the elderly and the poor.3 3 Other federal and state health
care insurance and similar programs pay roughly $40 billion in benefits
annually.3 4
Medicare provides reimbursement for hospital costs and physi-
cians' services for individuals who are eligible for the Social Security
old age and disability insurance programs, for nearly all elderly individ-
uals not eligible for Social Security, and for persons with end stage re-
nal disease.3 5 The hospital-cost insurance program known as Part A is
provided free of charge; under Part B, eligible individuals must pay
premiums to obtain insurance for the costs of physicians' services.
Medicaid is the federal program that matches the states' provision of
health care assistance to low-income individuals regardless of age.3 6
The amount of assistance provided varies considerably from state to
state.
b. Disability Insurance. - Two large federal programs, Social Se-
curity Disability (SSD) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), pro-
vide benefits to persons who are permanently and totally disabled.3 7
Together these programs pay annual benefits of approximately $35
billion.3 8
Most workers who become permanently disabled are eligible for
SSD benefits, which are monthly payments calculated in virtually the
And unemployment insurance is in a sense triggered by limited forms of fault or cause
as well as by loss, since those out of work after they quit or are fired for cause are
ineligible. No easy conceptual taxonomy organizes these large programs, because they
were invented at different times to respond to different problems, and to reflect different
social judgments.
32. Medicare and Medicaid were created by Congress in 1965. See Health
Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 290 (1965) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988)); Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs Act, Pub.
L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988)).
33. Medicare pays approximately $94 billion of this sum, and Medicaid pays the
remaining $65 billion. See 1991 Source Book, supra note 16, at 38-39.
34. See id. at 40-4 1.
35. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c, 1395o (1988).
36. See id. § 1396 (1988).
37. SSD was created by Congress in 1956. See Social Security Amendments of
1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, 70 Stat. 807 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1988)).
SSI was created sixteen years later. See Supplemental Security Income for the Aged,
Blind and Disabled Act, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1465 (1972) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d (1988)).
38. In 1988, SSD paid benefits of approximately $24 billion; SSI paid
approximately $11 billion. See Statistical Abstract, supra note 9, at 360.
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same manner as Social Security retirement benefits. Eligibility requires
that a claimant (1) have worked at covered employment for the requi-
site number of quarters; (2) suffer from an inability to work that is
"medical" in nature; and (3) be permanently and totally disabled. 39
"Permanently" is defined as suffering from an affliction likely to last for
one year or more, and "totally" as being unable to perform "any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy." '40
The second eligibility condition, that a claimant's inability to work
be "medically determinable," excludes from coverage workers whose
unemployment is caused by declines in capacity or willingness to work
that cannot be explained medically. This requirement, which results in
major dispute-resolution difficulties over such issues as eligibility for
individuals affected by alcoholism and drug addiction, is central to the
political and moral judgments that underlie the program. Congress has
chosen to compensate some individuals for the unfortunate things that
happen to them, but not to compensate others who are in economic
need. In part, the distinction attempts to separate those whose own
choices and decisions brought about their inability to work from those
whose behavior is socially unobjectionable but who have been victim-
ized by a medical event.
In fact, of course, the social judgment embodied in the program is
imperfectly captured by the line between medical and nonmedical disa-
bilities. Millions of people have shortcomings that result at least par-
tially from injury, disease, or physical or mental decline and that restrict
their employment opportunities. The real issue in determining
whether they should qualify for benefits is not whether their disability
can be diagnosed as medical. Rather, the thousands of cases that have
been decided by written opinions show administrative and judicial deci-
sion-makers analyzing a complex series of factors, including the claim-
ant's physical and mental abilities, age, sex, level of education and
skills, as well as the structure of the relevant labor market.41
SSD is in a sense a supplement to the permanent total disability
component of workers' compensation described earlier. Whereas
workers' compensation covers only work-related disability, SSD is avail-
able whether or not a person's handicapping illness or injury was
caused by employment. But SSD uses the same benefit formula as the
Social Security retirement program, and therefore replaces only a small
percentage of wages for all but the lowest-income workers. Thus most
workers with a non-work-related disability will suffer a substantial in-
come loss unless they have bought disability insurance on their own,
their employers have provided it, or they have a cause of action in tort.
39. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(c)-(d) (1988).
40. Id. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A) (1988).
41. SeeJerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability
Claims 108-21 (1983).
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Another federal program paying benefits to the totally disabled
that resembles insurance, SSI, makes means-tested payments to per-
sons who are medically unfit for labor but either did not work enough
to achieve Social Security eligibility or receive some Social Security pay-
ments but have so little income and assets as to be eligible for SSI sup-
plementation. Included in this category are persons who are born with
a disability, those disabled during childhood, and those disabled as
adults before achieving sufficient participation in the labor force. Un-
like Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)4 2 or general re-
lief arrangements, SSI benefits are not conditioned on a work search or
acceptance of "improvement" services. Like SSD, however, SSI claim-
ants must also satisfy the statutory disability standard of being "unable
to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment" 43 likely to result in death
or to extend for twelve months. 44
Finally, five states and Puerto Rico operate short-term disability
programs that pay over $2 billion in benefits per year.45 These pro-
grams impose taxes on employers or employees and create funds from
which payments are made to persons who become totally disabled for a
period of months.
II. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG COMPENSATION PROGRAMS
The most striking feature of the "system" of compensation that we
have just described is that it is not systematic at all. The United States
lacks an intellectual structure to undergird its web of programs com-
pensating the victims of illness and injury. In attempting to understand
the different principles that underlie the current system and the direc-
tions that future development might take, two issues merit particular
attention: (1) the goals of current compensation programs and (2) the
methods by which they coordinate the benefits they pay. Analysis of
each of these issues helps to uncover the relationships among American
compensation programs and sets the stage for our discussion of the
possibilities for expanding and restructuring the system in Part III.
42. See Aid to Families with Dependent Children Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687
(1988). Although AFDC is America's chief minimum inicome program, benefits are
available only for families with children, and in no state do benefits place families at or
above the so-called poverty line. $29 billion was spent on this program in 1988. See
Statistical Abstract, supra note 9, at 358.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1988).
44. Some proposals call for a less rigorous standard of disability in SSI than that
used in SSD, premised on the idea that a minimum income at the SSI level should be
available to anyone who is not in good health and cannot in fact find work. See Sheila R.
Zedlewski & Jack A. Meyer, Toward Ending Poverty Among the Elderly and Disabled
Through SSI Reform 47-70 (1989).
45. In 1989, for example, these programs paid out $2.7 billion. See Soc. Security
Bull., Spring 1992, at 124. The five states are California, NewJersey, New York, Hawaii,
and Rhode Island. See id.
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A. The Goals of Existing Programs
In Part I, we isolated the three bases upon which American com-
pensation programs pay the victims of illness and injury: fault, cause,
and loss. These programs can serve one or more of four principal
goals: corrective justice, deterrence, forced insurance, and income re-
distribution. It is possible at least in theory to envision at one extreme
a program concerned exclusively with corrective justice and deter-
rence-a system of civil liability for blameworthy behavior. At the
other extreme would lie programs concerned exclusively with the redis-
tribution of income to those suffering illness and injury. In between
would lie programs of forced insurance, which, through various meth-
ods of pricing and risk classification, would combine elements of deter-
rence with elements of income redistribution.
While existing programs serve a mixture of these goals, typically
one of the goals predominates. The dominant goal of each existing
program can be discerned by examining the sources of funds used to
pay claims, the nature of the events that are compensable, and the mea-
sure of compensation employed by the program.
1. Fault-Based Systems. - The tort system is the primary fault-
based system for compensating victims of personal injury. Under the
tort system, the injurer is the source of payment. Compensation is paid
for full out-of-pocket loss and pain and suffering, except when the vic-
tim was also at fault, in which case damages are reduced (or denied
entirely, in the few states which still adhere to contributory negligence)
in proportion to the negligence attributable to the victim. Corrective
justice and optimal deterrence are the conventionally understood goals
of this arrangement. But in several respects the matter is more compli-
cated than this simple analysis suggests. First, as many commentators
have noted, the existence of liability insurance tends to undermine both
the corrective justice and deterrence rationales for the imposition of
tort liability.4 6 An insured defendant does not personally correct the
injustice done in causing injury to the plaintiff; rather, the defendant's
liability insurer performs this correction. When the magnitude of the
defendant's insurance premiums is not closely related to the magnitude
of the defendant's liabilities, the defendant does not even perform this
correction indirectly. Under these circumstances, the threat of tort lia-
bility may not only fail to achieve corrective justice, but may also fall
short of promoting optimal deterrence, because a defendant can exter-
nalize the risk of liability through the purchase of liability insurance. 4 7
Second, even aside from the impact of liability insurance, the im-
position of liability in the long-latency toxic tort cases that have increas-
46. See I American Law Inst., Reporters' Study, Enterprise Responsibility for
Personal Injury 24-33 (1991) (noting this argument and its proponents).
47. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and
Public Policy 64-83 (1986).
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ingly become the focus of controversy within the tort system is unlikely
to achieve the goals of corrective justice and optimal deterrence. In
such cases the management and shareholders at the time a wrongful act
is committed are unlikely to be those who, decades later, sustain the
cost of any liability that is imposed for the consequences of the act of a
defendant corporation. Consequently, the parties who are wrongdoers
or benefit from wrongdoing do not correct the injustice suffered by the
victims of long-latency torts. Rather, that injustice is corrected later by
others, assuming that the party or parties held liable are solvent. On
occasion, the price of shares in a business incorporates a discount for
an already-identified probability that the business will be held liable for
some past conduct. In such instances, those responsible for the con-
duct may well bear the cost of its predicted consequences. But when a
particular risk of future harm has not yet been recognized nor potential
liability for the risk accurately gauged, no such specific discount occurs.
Thus, unless the risks associated with a particular pattern of conduct
are recognized at the time the conduct takes place, the threat of tort
liability for its consequences is unlikely to have the optimizing effect on
risk at the core of the deterrence rationale.4 8
Third, in a large group of tort cases, the plaintiff and the defendant
are not strangers, but stand in a direct or indirect contractual relation-
ship with each other. Patients and their physicians fall into this cate-
gory, as do product purchasers and sellers. Economic theory predicts
that in efficiently operating markets these parties will contract for the
mix of safety, liability, and compensation they prefer, 49 and so satisfy
their desire for corrective justice and optimal deterrence. Yet, in pre-
scribing a particular mix of liability and compensation and in making
most forms of tort liability for personal injury nondisclaimable, tort law
precludes such contractual arrangements. One perfectly plausible ex-
planation for this blanket no-disclaimer rule is that, on balance, the
markets for health care services and consumer products are not suffi-
ciently efficient to permit contract to displace tort, and case-by-case in-
quiry regarding whether the requisite conditions for permitting
displacement had existed would be prohibitively expensive. A comple-
mentary explanation is that the no-disclaimer rule has a paternalistic
motive: to force potential victims to insure themselves against personal
injury. If tort liability could be disclaimed, potential victims might not
use the resulting price savings to insure themselves against the risk that
they would be injured by the health care or the products they
purchased. The no-disclaimer rule assures that victims are "insured"
48. See Donald N. Dewees, Economic Incentives for Controlling Industrial Disease:
The Asbestos Case, 15 J. Legal Stud. 289, 317-19 (1986) (arguing that in asbestos
context, the presence or absence of tort liability has little effect on a firm's incentives to
reduce worker exposure).
49. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 6-8
(1960).
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against losses caused by tortious action, with the likely consequence
that potential injurers will charge potential victims at least part of the
cost of this "insurance" through increased charges for health care or
consumer products.
Finally, even when the threat of tort liability does have a deterrent
effect on potential injurers, it may fail to create optimal incentives for
potential victims to avoid injury and to reduce their losses after injury.
The effects of the doctrine of comparative negligence on victim behav-
ior are uncertain. Moreover, the recoverability of compensation in tort
that is not subject to monetary deductibles or coinsurance creates ex
post moral hazard: victims sure of recovery in tort are more likely to
consume excessive medical care and not to return to work after injury
than are victims without any prospect of recovery in tort.
In short, the conventional picture of the tort system as a corrective
justice and'deterrence regime is overly simple. Tort liability is also a
forced-insurance arrangement, under which potential victims are re-
quired to insure themselves against the risk of suffering injury from the
provision of health care or the sale of a product. In this respect, at
least, tort law constitutes a disguised insurance program that resembles
some of the programs that more explicitly perform this function. But
unlike many of those programs, in our view, tort law is not a very sensi-
ble system of victims' insurance: it makes compensation available only
when the injurer's fault can be demonstrated; it reduces compensation
to the extent that the victim was at fault; its transactions costs are high;
it covers pain and suffering in unlimited amounts even though many
victims would wish limited or no such coverage ex ante; and in providing
first-dollar coverage without explicit deductibles or coinsurance, it
makes itself vulnerable to ex post moral hazard.50
2. Cause-Based Systems. - Certain of the cause-based programs
perform the forced-insurance function much more effectively. In fact,
each major non-means-tested cause-based program incorporates a
forced-insurance feature. For example, workers' compensation, a
cause-based system of nearly absolute liability for work-related per-
sonal injury, is obviously much less concerned with corrective justice
than tort law and relatively more concerned with assuring compensa-
tion for those suffering such injury. Like the nondisclaimability of tort
liability, the mandatory character of workers' compensation can be
viewed as a reflection of this aim. At least part of the cost of the em-
ployer's liability is financed indirectly by employees, who in effect pay a
mandatory premium (through wages that are lower than they would
otherwise be) for the insurance protection they receive through work-
ers' compensation. The other major cause-based system of compensa-
tion, auto no-fault, quite transparently incorporates a forced-insurance
50. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
Yale LJ. 1521, 1550-63 (1987) (discussing failure of tort law as an insurance
mechanism).
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feature, since it requires potential victims themselves to purchase insur-
ance protection.51
Because workers' compensation and auto no-fault are cause-based
systems, however, they retain some capacity to promote deterrence.
And because they employ less than perfectly-refined risk classification,
they also embody some income redistribution from potential to actual
victims of work- and auto-related injury and illness. In effect, these are
intermediate, mixed programs whose main goal appears to be forced
insurance, but that incorporate deterrence and income redistribution as
subsidiary goals.
3. Loss-Based Systems. - The structure and financing of the non-
means-tested loss-based insurance programs reveal that forced insur-
ance is also one of their major goals. Over 80% of private health and
disability insurance is purchased on a group basis, generally as a fringe-
benefit of employment. 5 2 In most states, the provision of this coverage
is not legally mandatory, 53 but health insurance and short-term disabil-
ity coverage have become such ordinary benefits of employment by me-
dium-size and large firms that their existence reflects a social
precommitment to insurance in these settings, reinforced by the in-
come tax subsidy provided such benefits. Many employment-based pri-
vate loss insurance programs, however, also use reasonably refined risk
classification and managed-care features that are likely to have at least
mild deterrence effects. 5 4
Similarly, because the two major non-means-tested social insur-
ance programs, SSD and Medicare, are both partially financed by po-
tential beneficiaries and are mandatory, they contain a strong forced-
insurance component. They respectively help to assure that virtually all
disabled citizens have minimum insurance against loss of income result-
ing from disability and that the elderly have minimum insurance against*
the cost of hospitalization. Given the demands that would be placed on
the public fisc in the absence of this component of SSD and Medicare,
the method of financing these two programs can be regarded in part as
a nonprogressive 55 tax that avoids the income redistribution to the dis-
51. In contrast, the federal Black Lung Benefits Program, financed largely by the
coal industry, is less a forced insurance scheme among victims than a redistributive
programfor them. See Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1988).
52. See Health Ins. Ass'n of Am., Source Book of Health Insurance Data 5 (1989)
(health insurance); Health Ins. Ass'n of Am., Source Book of Health Insurance Data 16
(1984-85) [hereinafter 1984-85 Source Book] (disability insurance).
53. But see Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 392, 393 (1988) (requiring employers to provide
temporary disability and health care benefits for employees). Steps toward mandatory
health insurance have been taken in Massachusetts, Oregon, and Vermont.
54. Of course, efforts at cost containment can raise profound questions of fairness.
See, e.g., McGann v. H&H Music, 946 F.2d 401,404-08 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that an
employer many impose a low dollar limit on medical reimbursement for AIDS treatment
after an employee has tested HIV-positive), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Nov. 9,
1992) (No. 91-1283).
55. This characterization is a bit oversimplified. SSD can be regarded as somewhat
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abled and the elderly that might otherwise occur. But SSD is financed
by a wage tax that is paid half by employers and half by employees, 56
and Medicare is financed partly by the same type of wage tax and partly
from general federal revenues. 57 This component of SSD and Medi-
care financing makes them more purposefully redistributional.
Income redistribution, however, clearly is the major function of the
two principal means-tested loss-based insurance programs: Medicaid,
which provides health care assistance to the poor, and SSI, which pro-
vides income support to the disabled who are not eligible for SSD.
Both programs are noncontributory, and both insure only those with
very low or no income. 58 But this is income redistribution on a fairly
limited basis. Many of the working poor are ineligible for SSI because
they have been forced to insure themselves under SSD; and the same
individuals are ineligible for Medicaid in many states even if they have
no other health insurance, as is likely to be the case.
All of these loss-based programs, like the cause-based ones dis-
cussed above, contrast sharply with the tort system in one salient re-
spect. To varying degrees, these programs employ techniques
designed to manage or contain the incentives of insured victims to con-
sume a greater than optimal quantity of medical care or disability pro-
tection. These techniques for dealing with ex post moral hazard-
deductibles, coinsurance, managed care, ceilings on coverage, waiting
periods-vary from program to program, but each is directed at the
kind of post-accident "victim deterrence" that is notably missing from
the tort system, which in effect fully "insures" the victims it
compensates.
4. A Comparison of the Systems and Their Goals. - Arraying the bases
upon which American compensation programs make payment and the
programs' varied goals along two different axes reveals the following
structure:
progressive because the benefit formula is skewed toward low-wage workers. Medicare
can be regarded as somewhat regressive because richer people live longer and consume
greater amounts of expensive medical care.
56. See Bernzweig, supra note 5, at 33.
57. See Marilyn E. Manser, Historical and Political Issues in Social Security
Financing, in Social Security Financing 21, 35 (Felicity Skidmore ed., 1981).
58. See supra notes 35-36, 42-44 and accompanying text.
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In light of the preceding discussion of the mixed goals of these
programs, we have obviously oversimplified by suggesting in the matrix
that each program serves only one goal. But the matrix is nonetheless
revealing. The empty cells at the top right and bottom left demonstrate
that certain goals cannot easily predominate within certain kinds of
programs. For example, a loss-based compensation system could not
achieve precise and focused corrective justice and deterrence unless
premiums (or taxes) financing the system were calibrated to responsi-
bility for the losses covered by the system and paid by potential injur-
ers, who might in some cases be potential victims themselves. For
instance, oil companies, automobile manufacturers, and smokers would
have to be charged higher taxes to finance a national health insurance
program than pillow manufacturers and nonsmokers. In effect, financ-
ing would have to be cause-based even while the right to compensation
was loss-based. Such an approach is theoretically possible, but it would
pose enormous administrative difficulties. For this reason, it is unsur-
prising to see that no existing compensation system falls in the top
right cell of the matrix, although private loss-insurance programs seek
modestly to achieve deterrence by charging risk-classified premiums
and employing other cost-containment measures.
Similarly, it would be extremely difficult to use a fault-based system
to achieve wealth redistribution from those with high incomes to those
with low incomes. 59 If poor people do not suffer a disproportionately
59. In fact, it probably is true that in certain respects the wealthy are treated better
by the tort system than the poor. For example, in all likelihood the wealthy have
disproportionately greater access to the tort system than the poor for two reasons. The
first is cultural-the wealthy may be more likely than the poor to feel comfortable with
and be willing to use the legal system for redress. The second is a function of the
recoverability of full damages for wages lost as a proximate result of tortious action.
Because the wealthy are likely to suffer more lost wages from any given injury than the
poor, attorneys are more likely to be willing to represent them on a contingent-fee basis.
Moreover, whenever liability is imposed on a party in a direct or indirect contractual
relationship with the plaintiff, full recovery of lost wages in tort has a regressive income
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high (or low) share of the injuries resulting from malpractice or defec-
tive products, then an expansive (or restrictive) right to recover in tort
for such injuries will not benefit the poor disproportionately. And even
if tort law could be shaped so as to benefit poor plaintiffs dispropor-
tionately, one would have to take into account the impact of imposing
liability on particular categories of defendants and the resulting effect
on their employees and customers before one could be certain that a
particular rule had a net redistributional effect. Consequently, there is
no form of tort liability for personal injury whose main goal is income
redistribution, and the bottom left cell of the matrix is empty.
What the matrix does not reveal, however, is why the remaining
cells are filled the way they are. Some of the possible explanations
make sense, but some require closer analysis. For example, because
both fault- and cause-based systems of compensation have the potential
to promote deterrence, a nondeterrence explanation for the allocation
of some compensation functions to the tort system and others to cause-
based systems is desirable. The differences between the capacity of
these systems to achieve corrective justice is one possibility. As we
noted earlier,60 however, although the fault system takes theform of a
corrective justice system, the widespread incidence of liability insurance
limits the degree of correction that flows directly from the defendant to
the plaintiff. Moreover, some cause-based systems preserve an attenu-
ated sort of corrective justice by employing a financing mechanism that
charges the parties associated with injury-causing activities the cost of
compensating for these injuries. On the other hand, some cause-based
systems-most notably auto no-fault-have no capacity to promote
even this attenuated form of corrective justice, because they are fi-
nanced through premiums paid by potential victims, not by potential
injurers. Thus, it may be that the appearance of corrective justice influ-
ences the choice between fault- and cause-based systems.
Overall, however, the allocation of functions between fault- and
cause-based systems may be determined as much by practical consider-
ations as by reasons of principle or appearance. First, the kinds of per-
sonal injuries that have been carved out of the tort system and
transferred to cause-based systems often are those believed (sometimes
correctly and sometimes not) to be technically susceptible to treatment
on a causal basis. Work- and auto-related injuries, vaccine side effects,
black lung disease, and birth-related neurological defects are thought
to be both easily discernible and in the main distinguishable from other
redistributional effect, since all purchasers pay the same "premium" for tort liability
"insurance" as part of the price of a product or service, regardless of the magnitude of
the income they can expect to lose if they are the victim of tortious action for which a
seller is responsible. See Priest, supra note 50, at 1559. Placing a ceiling on the amount
of lost wages recoverable in tort (whatever else one thinks of the idea) would tend to
reduce this income-regressive effect.
60. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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kinds of injuries or diseases with other causes. 6 1 The development of
broad-based medical, products, or environmental injury compensation
systems based on causal responsibility has not yet been possible, how-
ever, precisely because of the difficulty of defining a conceptually sound
and easily applied compensable event in these fields-a difficulty that
has long been recognized.62
Second, as a matter of practical politics, it is almost always easier to
adopt a cause-based system if its cost is no greater than the cost of the
component of the tort system it replaces. 63 Thus one characteristic of
cause-based systems that recommends them is that they generally pay
beneficiaries their economic losses only, and often only partial eco-
nomic losses at that. The tort system, in contrast, purports to pay both
economic and noneconomic losses in full. But when the number of in-
juries resulting from fault is small in comparison to the number caused
without fault by the activity in question, even restricting payment to
economic losses alone may not be sufficient. Because compensating
the economic losses of all eligible claimants might cost more than the
component of the tort system a proposed cause-based system would
replace, employing cause-based systems runs into political obstacles.
Similarly, the decision to retain fault-based and cause-based sys-
tems at all when they overlap with loss-based systems is easy enough to
explain, but not always as easy to justify in principle. Even when it
would be feasible to employ broader-based loss insurance systems ex-
61. Part of the explanation for the current troubles facing workers' compensation,
however, may well lie in the new difficulty of drawing the work-/nonwork-relatedness
distinction. When workers' compensation was created to deal mainly with injury, it was
clear that a broken leg on the job was work-related. But with the advent of disease
claims that may or may not be work-related (for example, asbestosis, stress, heart
attacks), the work exposure allegedly responsible for the loss may have occurred
decades earlier, cigarette smoking by the employee may have magnified the probability
of loss by ten, and other factors may have intervened to render the work-relatedness
determination highly difficult and more costly to make.
62. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst & Lawrence R. Tancredi, "Medical Adversity
Insurance"-A No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51
Milbank Memorial Fund Q. 125 (1973) (proposing no-fault medical adversity insurance);
James Henderson, The Boundary Problems of Enterprise Liability, 41 Md. L. Rev. 659,
662-76 (1982) (calling for concrete lists of events triggering liability, yet admitting that
"techniques for avoiding errors of inclusion and exclusion have obvious limits").
63. This insight can be traced back in the academic literature at least as far as
Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto
Compensation Legislation, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 341, 342-43. Of course, this political fact
of life may rest as much on oversimplification as on accurate cost accounting. Some
apparently "new" costs may merely be shifted from one source to another rather than
newly incurred. The point holds not only for cause-based but also for loss-based
programs. Expanded health insurance costs more if more people get care, but if they
are getting it already, then the political debate about "increased" costs may merely
misread or misreport which current costs are being replaced. The point holds for cost
"cutting" as well. Medicaid can be "cut" by pushing the working poor into hospital
charity and then letting the cost of charity be passed to Blue Cross.
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clusively, we have retained tort liability, workers' compensation, and
auto no-fault, for example, because of our unwillingness to surrender
entirely the possibility of achieving corrective justice and deterrence in
the classes of cases that these systems cover. But these systems' capac-
ity to achieve corrective justice and deterrence is inherently limited.
Some of the well over $100 billion per year spent by these systems-
especially a portion of their transactions costs-might be better spent
compensating the losses of those who suffer illness and injury but are
ineligible for recovery in tort or from any cause-based system and are
not covered by private or social loss insurance. Proponents of funda-
mental reform of the tort system commonly make this suggestion, 64
though sometimes without a sufficient appreciation for the difficulties
of expanding our various systems of loss insurance. Conversely, the
proponents of health and disability insurance reform65 usually talk of
reform without referring at all to the relation between these fields and
the tort, workers' compensation, and other no-fault systems. To get a
sense of the possibilities, in the next section we examine how these re-
lationships actually operate and then turn in Part III to several visions
of the future.
B. Coordination of Benefits
The different programs for compensating the victims of injury and
illness analyzed thus far relate to each other not only conceptually; in
actual operation the coverage provided by the different programs
sometimes overlaps. Examining the methods these programs employ-
or fail to employ-in coordinating coverage in the event of such dupli-
cation is yet another way of understanding the American compensation
"system."
Focusing first on the relationship between the tort system and the
different cause-based compensation programs, it is apparent that in
many instances there is no duplication. For example, workers' compen-
sation is almost always an exclusive remedy against a claimant's em-
ployer; a claimant under the Florida and Virginia birth-injury programs
generally has no cause of action in tort;6 6 and an auto no-fault policy-
holder whose claim falls below the statutory tort "threshold" may not
bring an action alleging negligence by the driver who injured her. In
these instances a shift from the emphasis on corrective justice that is
64. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 1 (arguing that incentives to assess and avoid risk
are best promoted through ex ante private contract and private insurance); Sugarman,
supra note I (arguing for the replacement of personal injury law with a generous system
of social insurance).
65. See, e.g., Enthoven, supra note 3 (proposing a system of managed
competition); Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 3 (same).
66. See Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 766.301-766.306 (West Supp. 1992); Va. Code Ann.
§§ 38.2-5000-38.2-5021 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992).
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the hallmark of tort law toward forced insurance-a characteristic goal
of cause-based programs-has been decisively made.
In other situations, however, neither tort law nor a cause-based
program is the exclusive vehicle of recovery. Under such circum-
stances, each system has essentially three options: (1) to allow dupli-
cate (or overlapping) compensation; (2) to allocate primary coverage
responsibility to the tort system; or (3) to allocate primary coverage
responsibility to a cause-based system. Although cause-based systems
occasionally employ the first approach, for the most part they adopt
either the second or third. For example, workers' compensation takes'
the second approach. When an employee who has been paid workers'
compensation brings a suit against a third party (for example, the
maker of a product that caused the employee's injuries), the employer
or its insurer has a right to indemnification out of any tort recovery
received by the employee from the third party. The ostensible effect of
this arrangement is that the product maker, not the employer, bears the
full cost of the loss. Although in the long run the purchase price of the
product may be adjusted to take account of this effect, the message
clearly reflected in this arrangement is that the goals of tort law are of
greater importance than the goals of workers' compensation. In auto
no-fault, by contrast, the third option is employed. Here, the tortfeasor
is relieved of a portion of his or her liability, because auto no-fault ben-
efits typically are offset against any tort recovery obtained by a no-fault
policyholder. The message of this approach is that the goals of the no-
fault program take precedence over the goals of the tort system. While
there may be political explanations for this inconsistency, we can see no
persuasive basis for it in principle.
Loss-based systems also tend to interact quite inconsistently with
both fault- and cause-based systems. For example, until recently the
principle of coordination that applied when loss-based and other sys-
tems overlapped was similar to the principle by which tort and workers'
compensation recoveries currently are coordinated. In tort law, the
collateral source rule allowed the plaintiff to recover from the defend-
ant sums already paid to the plaintiff by loss-based systems of compen-
sation. Loss-based systems could be reimbursed out of these
recoveries pursuant to contractual or statutory rights of subrogation. 67
As a result, at least in theory, loss-based systems did not compensate
for losses paid by the tort system.68 Similarly, as between cause- and
loss-based compensation systems, the former shouldered ultimate cov-
erage responsibility. For example, Social Security Disability benefits
were, and still are, reduced by sums paid or payable by workers' com-
67. The exception was and is life insurance, which in general is not subject to rights
of subrogation or reimbursement.
68. In practice, however, double compensation of certain losses probably occurred
because insurers did not exercise their rights of subrogation or reimbursement out of
policyholders' tort recoveries. See 2 American Law Inst., supra note 46, at 170-71.
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pensation. 69 In short, loss-based insurance did not compensate for
losses paid by fault- or caused-based compensation programs.
Thus, coverage priority ran from fault-, to cause-, and finally to
loss-based compensation systems. The importance of corrective justice
and deterrence seemed to explain these priorities. When both fault-
and loss-based compensation were available, corrective justice and de-
terrence suggested that the tortfeasor or its liability insurer should bear
primary responsibility for compensating the victim. When both cause-
and loss-based compensation were available, concern for the promo-
tion of deterrence through cost-internalization required allocating pri-
mary coverage responsibility to the cause-based system. In both
situations, loss-based systems served as secondary sources of compen-
sation and the other systems were primary sources.
This overall consistency has recently been shattered, however, by
changes in the collateral source rule in tort law and by the development
of analogous changes within some of the newer cause-based systems.
The collateral source rule was partially or completely abolished by leg-
islation in more than a dozen jurisdictions during the last decade. 70 As
a consequence, in these jurisdictions most loss-based systems of private
and social insurance bear primary responsibility for losses that would
otherwise be compensable in tort. To complicate matters further, even
where this new scheme is applicable, it is subject to an exception for
Medicare and Medicaid benefits. State rules governing coordination
between these benefits and other sources of compensation are pre-
empted by provisions in the federal statutes creating Medicare and
Medicaid, under which the programs bear only secondary or tertiary
coverage responsibility.71 Similarly, several of the new cause-based
compensation schemes that have been carved out of the tort system
reverse the traditional coverage priorities described above. For exam-
ple, in many states, auto no-fault benefits are payable only to the extent
that workers' compensation and loss-based sources of compensation
are not available;72 and the Florida and Virginia birth-related neurolog-
ical defect funds pay medical expenses only to the extent that such ben-
efits are not payable by health insurance. 73
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 424a (1988).
70. For a catalogue of these and other tort reforms of the past decade, see Sanders
&Joyce, supra note 2, at 255-58.
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(o) (1988); see also Rubin v. Sullivan, 720 F. Supp. 840,
844-46 (D. Haw. 1989) (holding that Hawaii no-fault insurance statute exempting
Medicaid recipients from coverage was preempted by federal statute); Abrams v.
Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 1155, 1163-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (upholding federal regulation
prohibiting Medicare payments where state law's no-fault insurance benefits are
secondary to Medicare).
72. This allocation is subject to the exception for Medicare and Medicaid described
supra note 71 and accompanying text.
73. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 766.31(a) (West Supp. 1992); Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-
5009(1) (1990).
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One motive for these changes has almost certainly been the desire
to reduce the costs of the system that is made a secondary source of
compensation for the loss in question. Whatever else might be said in
favor of this motive, at the level of principle it is nearly empty, since the
change merely shifts costs from one system to another without reduc-
ing them overall. Indeed, to the extent that the older fault-over-cause-
over-loss approach to coverage priorities could be justified on deter-
rence grounds, the recent reversal of priorities is likely to increase mar-
ginally rather than decrease costs overall, because of the loss of
deterrence resulting from the reversal.
A very different justification for these changes, however, may well
have an arguable basis in principle. Under the traditional collateral
source rule, loss-based compensation rights were seen as assets of the
tort plaintiff-assets from which the defendant should not benefit and
which therefore were not offset against the plaintiff's recovery in tort.
For the same reason, payments from loss-based systems did not reduce
cause-based recoveries. It might now be argued that the recent rever-
sals of these traditional coverage priorities reflect the fact that cause-
and loss-based sources of compensation have proliferated. Employer-
provided health and disability insurance and Social Security Disability
benefits, for example, are so widespread that they no longer need be
considered uniquely individual assets. Rather, according to this argu-
ment, the implicit assumption underlying the new priorities is that
nearly everyone has such insurance. Since no one has made a con-
scious decision to purchase these forms of insurance instead of con-
suming other goods, rules denying the parties responsible for payment
under fault- or cause-based systems the benefit of the existence of loss-
based compensation have become unnecessary. The fact that the new
rules do not apply to life insurance-which remains largely a personal
consumption item purchased in varying amounts by different individu-
als-supports this thesis.
The assumption upon which this interpretation is based, however,
is inaccurate. Although private and social loss insurance is much more
widespread than it was even several decades ago, such coverage is not
as pervasive as the assumption suggests. As we noted in Part 1,74 thirty
million people have no health insurance, approximately 78% of the
workforce has no private insurance against long-term disability, and the
maximum Social Security Disability benefit covers only a portion of the
income lost from permanent total disability. Medicaid and SSI are also
incomplete programs of coverage. Thus, while there has been a trend
towards greater protection, substantial gaps in the fabric of private and
social insurance remain. Moreover, the reversal of coverage priorities
that makes loss insurance primary has been incomplete in two ways.
First, while some states have revised the traditional collateral source
74. See supra notes 19, 24, 41-42 and accompanying text.
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rule, others have not. Even in those states that have revised the rule,
the shift in priorities has been limited by the federal preemption in the
Medicare and Medicaid statutes. Second, workers' compensation has
retained the traditional priorities, while several but not all of the newer
cause-based systems have reversed them.
All this makes the effort to discern any principle or principles in
the American system of compensating for illness and injury extremely
difficult. The system is a patchwork of different programs that are
loosely and inconsistently coordinated. That condition is perhaps only
natural for a set of programs that did not grow up as a system and that
are only now being perceived as potentially systematic. For those
whose proposals for reform anticipate the development of a genuine
"system" of compensation, the challenge is to understand the obstacles
that stand in the path of such development and to devise ways of over-
coming them.
III. TOWARD A COHERENT SYSTEM OF COMPENSATION
If the different American compensation programs are to be woven
into a coherent and coordinated system, then greater attention will
have to be paid both to the scope of the individual programs and to the
relationships among them. We shall offer three different models of
more expansive, more coherent systems. These include: (1) a tort sys-
tem oriented mainly to achieving corrective justice and deterrence com-
bined with greater private and social insurance protection-a model we
call "broader categorical subsistence"; (2) a scheme embodying a simi-
larly limited tort system but more systematic private and social insur-
ance protection, which we call "full subsistence"; and (3) a scheme with
a very limited tort system and private and social insurance against virtu-
ally all the economic losses suffered by individuals as a result of illness
and injury, which we call "full welfare."
Our aim is not to recommend one approach over others, although
it is obvious that, because any actual expansion will likely be incremen-
tal, a "broader categorical subsistence" approach is in reality more
likely to be adopted than the other two more expansive approaches.
Rather, we want to analyze the obstacles that would impede a commit-
ment to any one of these intellectually valid approaches, and sketch the
contours of each approach, outlining the three different models toward
which the current system might evolve.
A. Obstacles to Expansion
Expanding the current patchwork of compensation programs
would generate considerable, but not insurmountable problems. In
what follows we discuss separately the difficulties that would be en-
countered in expanding health and disability insurance, for the two
forms of coverage face different challenges.
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1. Health Insurance. - The insurance system has shown itself quite
capable of providing adequate health insurance to the vast majority of
the American middle class, although without more adequate cost con-
trols it is uncertain whether that system will be able to continue in its
present form. Largely for reasons of cost, the system has not provided
health insurance to the working poor. The Pepper Commission esti-
mated that the additional federal cost (in 1990 dollars) of providing
adequate health insurance and long-term care to the entire population
would be $66 billion per year, about two-thirds of which would be net
new spending. 75 In one sense, this may be a low estimate, since with-
out more effective cost controls, the addition of this much demand is
likely to push health care costs even higher, with corresponding subse-
quent increases in the cost of the new programs. But it seems highly
likely that any major health insurance initiative will not only focus on
the financing of additional care, but include far-reaching cost-contain-
ment measures as well. These measures might counteract cost in-
creases that could otherwise be anticipated.
Moreover, in several other ways the Pepper Commission's estimate
of the cost of providing universal health care coverage may be mislead-
ingly high. First, certain overhead cost savings could be expected from
a universal health care program even if it retained reliance on the pri-
vate market to supply the lion's share of coverage. For example, if leg-
islation prescribed several different model forms of coverage that the
private market would be permitted to offer, the costs of determining
eligibility, complying with insurers' different documentation require-
ments, and processing claims would decline. 76
Second, it is possible that with the advent of universal health insur-
ance, reducing the scope of tort liability would find more political favor
than at present, and that the savings from this reform could be used to
help finance the health insurance system. For example, a significant
portion of the tort system's dollars are spent processing and litigating
auto-accident claims-yet auto liability ranks low in its capacity to
achieve either corrective justice or deterrence. Similarly, a portion of
tort dollars is spent on the kind of long-latency disease claims that we
argued earlier also have a limited capacity to achieve corrective justice
or deterrence. 7 7 If automobile and long-latency tort liability were re-
formed, the resulting savings could help offset the cost of universal
health insurance. Indeed, although major stand-alone tort reform is
75. See Pepper Recommendations, supra note 3, at 21. Of the $23 billion of this
sum that would be devoted to health insurance, about $12 billion would be net new
spending, since $11 billion would be offset by savings to employers and the states. See
U.S. Bipartisan Comm'n on Comprehensive Health Care, A Call For Action 67 (1990)
(Final Report) [hereinafter A Call for Action].
76. One recent study suggests that there could be considerable savings from such a
move. See Canadian Health Insurance, supra note 3, at 62-70.
77. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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politically improbable at present, legislation enacting health insurance
reform is a promising vehicle for accomplishing a trade-off between
health insurance expansion and the reduction of tort liability.78
Third, the American health insurance system is only at the begin-
ning of an era in which preventive care, designed to minimize the inci-
dence of illness and injury, and "managed care" measures, directed at
deterring excessive and unnecessary treatment, are being employed.
Moreover, in the case of any partial substitution of health insurance for
tort liability, preventive and managed care might well accomplish cer-
tain forms of deterrence at which tort law and many cause-based sys-
tems have been less successful because they tend to pay compensation
without using explicit deductibles, coinsurance, or other cost-minimiz-
ing devices. The cost sacrifice that results from reduced deterrence of
injurers may thus be at least partially offset by the cost savings gener-
ated by devices that focus on post-accident victim deterrence, albeit by
reducing actual compensation somewhat.
Finally, a considerable portion of the cost of a universal health care
program would not constitute "new," but rather shifted costs. Admit-
tedly, some portion of the Pepper Commission's estimated costs of
such a program would appear to be entirely new; that is, they would be
costs that previously were not incurred, because some patients receiv-
ing care under the new program would not have received such care in
the past. But the remainder of the cost of the program would be for
care that has been provided in some other way in the past-free of
charge by a public hospital, private hospital, or physician and either
charged off as a bad debt or recovered from an insurer as overhead
reimbursement. Under the new system, the cost of this previously pro-
vided care would be a saving to insureds, providers, and insurers that
should be offset against the gross cost of the new program in order to
calculate its net cost. 79
In addition, there is a strong argument that in calculating the net
cost of a universal health insurance program, two other kinds of savings
should also be offset against even the entirely new cost of such a pro-
gram: (1) the savings in future health care costs resulting from in-
creased preventive care under the program; and (2) the increased social
productivity that additional health care would generate. Although the
magnitude of these potential savings is not easy to estimate, the savings
would undoubtedly have a measurable effect on the net cost of univer-
sal health insurance.
In short, in an era of economic and budgetary hard times, the $66
billion price tag on universal health and long-term care insurance poses
a daunting obstacle to the adoption of such a system. But that is a
78. The Pepper Commission itself estimated that approximately $1.5 billion could
be saved through imposition of a cap on liabilities. See A Call For Action, supra note
75, at 66.
79. The Commission estimated this savings at $9.5 billion in 1990 dollars. See id.
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gross-cost estimate, against which it is reasonable to offset unquantifi-
able but probably substantial savings that would result from the enact-
ment of such a program.
2. Disability Insurance. - In contrast to health insurance, which is
provided on a widespread basis to the middle class, the failure of the
American compensation system to provide adequate long-term disabil-
ity insurance even to the American middle class has no immediately
obvious explanation. Why does private disability insurance play so
small a role in the American system of compensation for the conse-
quences of illness and injury? Of course, one possible answer is that
the potential beneficiaries of such compensation simply do not want it.
We believe that this explanation is both inaccurate and simplistic, how-
ever, for it ignores the factors that inhibit the development of a robust
market in disability insurance on both the supply and the demand sides
of this market.
a. The Nature of the Problem. - The history of private disability in-
surance is mainly the story of a series of lessons learned by the insur-
ance industry and of the progressive sophistication of the instruments
used to provide disability insurance coverage in response. Two periods
are particularly noteworthy. First, after the Great Depression, it be-
came clear that there was a strong linkage between economic condi-
tions and the frequency and severity of claims.80 Second, the extension
of SSD to virtually all Social Security participants after 1956, the
growth of some state disability protection programs, and the indexing
of SSD benefits in 1972 essentially have made the lower-income market
an unlikely source of private disability insurance policyholders. 8 1 In-
surers have recognized that disability insurance is a specialty line, re-
quiring a fund of experience and an operation designed to confront
and neutralize the factors that render the line volatile. Disability insur-
80. Prior to World War I, disability insurance was available but uncommon.
Between 1918 and 1929, however, the industry grew significantly and coverage was
more widely purchased. See Charles E. Soule, Disability Income Insurance: The Unique
Risk 4 (1989). When the depression of 1929 struck, disability insurers experienced for
the first time the special problems with which they continue to struggle today. As
unemployment increased, both the number of disability insurance claims and the
average period of disability grew with it. In addition, the policyholder's will to work
influenced his or her likelihood and rate of recovery. At this point, many of the insurers
then writing disability coverage recognized that this line of insurance is much more
volatile and requires very different underwriting and claims management skills than
does life insurance. They tended to withdraw from the market, leaving it largely to
specialty carriers, who revised their policies in an attempt to guard against the claims
incentives they had created. This state of affairs continued for roughly the next 25 years.
After several decades of stability, however, many companies entered the market during
the 1960s. In addition, recognizing that the professional and the self-employed markets
were potentially highly profitable, insurers increased maximum benefit levels available
under disability insurance policies. By the early 1970s, benefits of $3500 per month
were common. See id. at 10.
81. See id. at 11-13.
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ance is not regarded as a ready source of easy profit. On the contrary,
because insurers are wary about disability insurance, it is not widely
marketed on an individual basis, and competition in the line does not
appear to be intense.
If the history of disability insurance were all there were to explain
this state of affairs, it would be reasonable to wonder why the insurance
industry's entrepreneurial incentives had not created a more active
market by now. With its hard-won sophistication, the industry would
be able to place appropriate limits on its exposure through underwrit-
ing prudence and carefully drafted policy provisions, tap the reservoir
of demand for disability protection, and write vastly expanded amounts
of coverage. Unfortunately, more than mere caution born of the his-
tory of this line of insurance stands in the way of such an expansion.
Two separate obstacles afflicting the supply side of the market place
severe and probably inescapable limits on the potential scope of the
private disability insurance market.
First, the threat of adverse selection limits the supply of disability
insurance.8 2 The consequence of adverse selection, of course, is higher
premium charges for standard and low-risk policyholders. In the ab-
sence of adverse selection, premiums for these individuals would be
lower; more would apply for coverage, and those who insure notwith-
standing the higher rates would purchase more coverage than under
the present regime. The magnitude of the impact of adverse selection
on disability premiums is difficult to estimate, but the problem un-
82. All voluntary insurance is afflicted to some extent by adverse selection, the
disproportionate tendency of those who are more likely to suffer losses to seek insurance
against those losses. Disability insurance is especially susceptible to adverse selection,
however, because the application-screening and risk-classification processes that can be
used to neutralize this problem tend to be least effective in the disability insurance
context. The effectiveness of each method depends on the insurer's ability to determine
the probability that an applicant will suffer a disability. If insurers can identify high-risk
applicants, either their applications can be declined or they can be charged
appropriately higher premiums than standard risks.
Information about these probabilities is likely to be less available in disability
insurance, however, than in many other lines. One reason is that morbidity data is
neither as available nor as reliable as, for example, mortality data. During the past
twenty years more reliable information has been developed on both the frequency of
disability claims and the rate of recovery. But the persistent lack of reliable data has
contributed to adverse selection problems, which in turn have limited the market for
coverage and prevented the accumulation of reliable data. The problem has thus to
some extent been self-perpetuating. See id. at 16. A second reason the problem of
adverse selection is especially severe in disability insurance derives from the nature of
the insured event itself. Disability is not merely an objective phenomenon like injury or
death; it also is a subjective product of illness, injury, or disease. Insurers can of course
estimate the probability that an individual will be injured or become sick. But the
probability that the injury or sickness will disable any given individual depends in part
on his or her personality and character, both of which are likely to be more difficult to
assess. Both the underwriting and risk-classification decisions in disability insurance are
therefore unusually subjective and may fail to neutralize adverse selection.
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doubtedly is partly responsible for the inactivity of the market. 83
Second, the problem of moral hazard so afflicts the entire market
that there are effective limits on the form and amount of disability in-
surance that insurers can safely sell. Moral hazard is the tendency of an
insured party to exercise less care to minimize losses than he would
exercise if he were uninsured.8 4 In disability insurance, moral hazard is
present both ex ante and ex post. That is, the insured individual is more
likely than the uninsured individual to become disabled, to recover
from a disability more slowly, and never to recover from a disability. 85
Disability insurers try to combat the different forms of moral hazard
that afflict disability insurance by providing the insured with incentives
to remain healthy and to recover as quickly as possible from any disabil-
ity that is suffered. For example, disability insurance usually is written
to cover no more than roughly 60% of the potential after-tax income
loss that would be caused by a disability, and insurers attempt to coor-
dinate coverage so that this ceiling is not exceeded even when the in-
sured is entitled to disability payments from other sources, such as SSD
or workers' compensation. Even this ceiling, however, may not be suffi-
cient to combat moral hazard completely. 8 6 And the obvious conse-
83. For technical discussions of the nature and magnitude of the effect of adverse
selection in insurance markets, see Michael Rothschild &Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information,
90 QJ. Econ. 629, 634-38 (1976); Charles Wilson, A Model of Insurance Markets with
Incomplete Information, 16J. Econ. Theory 167, 187-202 (1977).
84. See Abraham, supra note 47, at 14-16.
85. Moral hazard troubles most forms of insurance, but like adverse selection, it is
especially severe in disability insurance. Admittedly, the most blatant form of ex ante
moral hazard-intentionally suffering a loss-is likely to be minimal because of the
insured party's self-interest in avoiding injury or disease, although perhaps for some
people the prospect of even disabled leisure may be more attractive than working in
good health. But undoubtedly the greater ex ante moral hazard in disability insurance is
the possibility of"false positives"-claims of disability when none exists. Some of these
may border on fraud; others are likely to be the product of economic conditions that
reduce the job prospects of the marginally able and in effect push them into the disabled
category. Because the very concept of disability and its corresponding definition in
disability policies is partially subjective in the ways we noted above, see supra notes
40-41 and accompanying text, such ineligible claims are difficult to detect, and some
are paid. Moreover, the cost of detection and the percentage of contested claims are
comparatively high.
False positive disability insurance claims are a potential problem not only ex ante,
but also ix post. Even after a genuine disability, the prospect of continued subsidized
leisure is likely to be more attractive for some people than returning to work; and
because of economic conditions, claimants who become marginally able to work may
remain "disabled" because they cannot find a job.
86. The existence of a variety of government benefits, for example, sometimes
makes the calculation of this ceiling difficult for private insurers. Of course they could
operate their payment schedule so as to pay only in addition to what any government
program pays and only a total that is, for example, 80% of pre-disability earnings. But
government program rules sometimes prohibit offsets and reductions (this is a
complicated issue in various programs, with interesting recent law), and even when
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quence of this device is that those who are genuinely disabled may be
unable to maintain their previous standard of living because their losses
are only partially insured.
Finally, psychological factors may affect the market for disability
insurance. Potential policyholders may misperceive the risk of suffering
a disability, and this inadequate knowledge of or concern about the
prospect of disability may thereby limit the demand for disability insur-
ance.8 7 We would not be at all comfortable relying exclusively on this
permitted, it may be expensive and intrusive for the insurer to discover a policyholder's
other sources of income (for example, from part-time or unreported work). Thus, there
are real world situations in which continued disability actually pays more than returning
to work (especially on an after-tax and after-work-expenses basis), making moral hazard
a continued threat.
87. There are two reasons why, in theory, potential purchasers of private disability
insurance may be "underconsuming" this product. First, psychological studies of
decision-making under uncertainty suggest that people typically underestimate the risk
of low-probability, unpleasant events. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263, 275, 282-83
(1979). For a theoretical application of this literature to disability insurance purchases,
see Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Disability Insurance and Public Policy 28-35 (1981). Below a
certain threshold level of probability, such risks are ignored. If total disability is
perceived as a low-probability event, then this perception may partly explain the
comparatively limited individual demand for disability insurance. Second, potential
purchasers may assume that the forms of insurance that already cover them against
certain kinds of disability-workers' compensation and social security-provide broader
or more generous coverage than in fact they do.
Some corroboration of this "underconsumption" theory can be found in the actual
pattern of disability insurance purchases. Counting paid sick leave as short-term
disability insurance, more than twice as many people are covered by short-term than by
long-term disability insurance. See 1984-85 Source Book, supra note 52, at 16. Long-
term total disability obviously is a much lower probability event than short-term
disability, and many people may simply ignore this risk, even though it is potentially
more devastating. A perfectly rational insurance consumer might be better advised to
bear a greater portion of the short-term disability risk herself and insure more of the
long-term risk.
How much influence these two possible risk misperceptions may have on the
demand for coverage is hard to say, in part because there is no objectively correct
insurance level against which to compare the levels actually purchased. The very notion
that the demand for disability insurance is "low" is therefore problematic. There is no
objective way to determine the "proper" amount of insurance for any individual.
Insurance consumption decisions are affected by the price of the product, funds
available for purchase, and the degree of risk aversion associated with the risk to be
insured. An effort to determine whether aggregate demand for disability insurance is
adequate in any ultimate sense therefore would not be sensible.
Nonetheless some insight into the nature of the demand for disability insurance can
be gained by comparing the risk of suffering a disability, the risk of dying, and the
amount of disability and life insurance purchased nationwide. At any given age the risk
of being disabled for more than six months is about equal to the risk of dying within a
year. See Soc'y of Actuaries, Part 6 Study Notes: Group Long-Term Disability
Coverages 2 (1976). Yet the nation spends considerably more on life insurance than on
long-term disability insurance. See Statistical Abstract, supra note 9, at 360, 519-20.
Moreover, only a small portion of the total expenditure on disability insurance is for
voluntary private (individual or group) coverage; the bulk is for social insurance that is
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psychological factor to explain the small role played by private, volun-
tarily-purchased disability insurance in the United States. This expla-
nation, however, may help to round out the picture of a market in
which the supply of coverage is seriously limited by the need to combat
adverse selection and moral hazard, and in which demand is unduly low
because of misperception of the risk of suffering an uninsured disabil-
ity. In any event, the prospect for the development of a more robust
voluntary private market for disability insurance is extremely weak.
b. Filling the Gap. - In light of the foregoing analysis, disability
insurance poses a challenge very different from the health insurance
problem. In the health insurance context, the key question is how to fill
the gap in coverage that afflicts a minority of the population. In the
disability insurance context, however, the threshold question is whether
the gap affecting the majority of the population should be filled. Given
the impact of adverse selection on the voluntary market for disability
insurance, mandated private coverage or expanded provision by the
government are probably the only feasible approaches. Yet this could
entail considerable cost.
Estimating the cost of a mandatory universal total disability insur-
ance system is difficult for both conceptual and practical reasons. So-
cial consensus as to what events are appropriate reasons for not being
at work is continually evolving. The current controversy over "family
leave" is an excellent example. 88 Estimating the costs of long-term dis-
ability compensation, moreover, requires decisions about which reduc-
tions in earning ability-some of which are predictable results of aging,
for example-should count as "disabilities" for purposes of
measurement.
Even setting aside these important conceptual questions and using
definitions of disability adopted by existing studies of the issue,8 9 esti-
mating costs poses practical problems. Nonetheless, an estimate of the
order of magnitude of the costs involved is possible. We calculate that
public and private insurance benefits for disability under six months
either publicly funded and mandatory (SSD) or privately financed and effectively
mandatory (workers' compensation). In contrast, most life insurance is voluntarily and
privately purchased in the commercial market. Of course, the comparison is not entirely
fair since disability is merely a risk, while death at some point is certain. But many
people do not buy "permanent" life insurance; they purchase term insurance or forms
of whole life insurance that has coverage that terminates or can be transferred into
accumulated cash-value. Consequently, although the comparison is not entirely fair, it is
revealing. Given the apparent contrast in demand for insurance against the roughly
equivalent statistical risks of annual long-term disability and death within a year, the risk
misperception hypothesis is at least plausible.
88. The Family Leave Act, S.5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), was vetoed by
President Bush. The veto was overridden in the Senate but not the House. See
Kenneth J. Cooper, House Fails to Override Bush Veto of Family Leave, Wash. Post,
Oct. 1, 1992, at A7.
89. See Daniel N. Price, Cash Benefits for Short-Term Sickness: Thirty-Five Years
of Data, 1948-83, 49 Soc. Security Bull., May 1986, at 5.
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duration probably now total about $20 billion of the roughly $55 bil-
lion in income lost each year from such disability, leaving a shortfall of
about $35 billion.90 Estimating the shortfall for disability exceeding six
months is more difficult, because there are no comparable figures re-
garding total income lost from such disability. Assuming that the ratio
of benefits paid to total income lost is roughly the same for short-term
and long-term disability,9 1 then the approximately $60 billion in cur-
rent public and private long-term disability benefits paid falls short of
providing full compensation by about $100 billion per year. Putting
these very rough estimates of the compensation shortfalls in disability
protection together, the total compensation shortfall is in the neighbor-
hood of $130 billion.92 An efficient system of compensation, however,
would not provide full payment for all these losses. A 30 to 40%o de-
ductible or coinsurance feature for disability insurance would be sensi-
ble, in order to combat moral hazard and create appropriate incentives
against overconsumption of benefits. Taking these features into ac-
count, the additional cost of a system that adequately compensated the
disabled for the economic consequences of both short- and long-term
disability would probably be in the range of $100 billion per year.
As in the case of health insurance, a portion of this additional cost
of universal disability insurance would probably not be "new," but
rather, shifted cost. Those who now lose wages because of uninsured
disability bear this cost themselves; a universal disability insurance pro-
gram would remove these costs from the uninsured and channel them
through the new program. In contrast to the health insurance example,
however, a higher portion of the cost of universal disability insurance
would in fact be truly new cost. Under universal disability insurance,
both ex ante and ex post moral hazard would be likely to increase the
frequency and extent of disability; and there would be fewer offsetting
savings from such measures as preventive and managed care because
these measures are far less developed in the disability field than in the
health insurance field.
3. The Public-Private Issue. - It is commonplace to regard reliance
on the private market for the provision of even mandatory insurance
(for example, auto liability insurance) as preferable to governmentally
provided coverage. Competition among private insurers is thought to
90. For the 1983 estimates on which this very crude projection is based, see id.
91. This assumption itself may be somewhat suspect, since major federal benefit
programs (most notably SSD) compensate some long-term disability but little or no
short-term disability. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
92. Rough confirmation that at least the order of magnitude of this estimate is
accurate is provided by a recent study conducted by the RAND Institute for CivilJustice.
That study found a wage-loss compensation shortfall for the victims of nonfatal
accidents (that is, the estimate excluded wages lost because of fatal accidents and all
illness, but included income loss from both short- and long-term disability) of
approximately $51 billion per year. See Deborah R. Hensler et al., Compensation for
Accidental Injuries in the United States 85 (1991).
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preserve the virtues of efficiency and autonomous choice that are
widely valued in our society. Aside from the obstacles to expanding
health and disability insurance, the question whether such expansion
should rely on the private market or occur through the development of
social insurance therefore must also be addressed.
In our view, the choice between the private and social insurance
alternatives is both more problematic and, in certain respects, less im-
portant than the prevailing view suggests. First, at least in some re-
spects, a universal social insurance system could capture economies of
scale and uniformity that the private market now lacks. For example,
the administrative costs of our decentralized private health insurance
system may account for more than half the difference in cost between
the Canadian and American systems.93 Such savings could go a long
way toward offsetting the decreased efficiency that could result from
the absence of a competitive insurance environment. Clearly this issue
is far from settled; our point is simply that the private insurance market
is subject to its own inefficiencies and that these must be compared to
the inefficiencies of social insurance in choosing between the two.
Second, the differences between private and social insurance are
less important when both approaches have mixed goals, combining lim-
ited deterrence and modest income redistribution with the predomi-
nant goal of forced insurance. Whether the evolution is from the
direction of the tort system, in which the deterrence goal predominates,
or from traditional social insurance, in which income redistribution is
primary, the expanded programs of health and disability insurance that
we describe in the next section would lie midway between these ex-
tremes. Whether private or governmentally operated, universal health
insurance would employ preventive and managed care measures, risk
classification, deductibles, and coinsurance features to deter unneces-
sary cost; perhaps universal disability insurance would develop analo-
gous devices that are only modestly used at present. At the same time,
charges to those capable of paying for coverage ("premiums" if the
programs were private, "taxes" if they were not) could be set with an
eye toward financing the provision of coverage for those incapable of
paying for it, either through private insurance pools, governmentally
provided coverage, or some combination of the two. In short, many of
the concerns we have been analyzing could be effectively addressed by
either alternative.
B. Models of Expansion
The United States does not have a complete explanation for the
scope and character of the liability and insurance programs that cur-
93. See Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, The Deteriorating
Administrative Efficiency of the U.S. Health Care System, 324 New Eng. J. Med. 1253
(1991).
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rently compensate the victims of illness and injury.94 Available expla-
nations-including forced insurance and income redistribution-would
suggest expanding current programs. Indeed, one of the best argu-
ments for expanding the system is that current programs can only be
explained by principles that suggest expansion. European countries
and Japan provide such expanded protection. 95 The United States has
developed some, arguably even most, of the technology and devices
necessary to provide it.
Partly out of default, the tort system is now performing certain as-
pects of the task of compensating the victims of illness and injury. Yet
for reasons elaborated above, tort law is a highly unsatisfactory system
of compensation. 96 Random victims are protected at giant overhead
costs. Large sums go to lawyers rather than to compensating victims or
funding additional accident reduction. Thus it seems sensible to con-
sider adjusting private and social insurance programs to perform the
compensation function that is needed, while pursuing the legitimate
goals of tort law- corrective justice and deterrence-in different ways.
Adapting existing programs to attain new goals is hardly unknown;
workers' compensation and auto no-fault are the product of just this
sort of approach, the first now more than seventy-five years old and
even the second quite mature intellectually. Other recently adopted
cause-based systems have begun to follow suit.9 7
Any expansion of individual insurance programs should be com-
bined with the institution of a coherent system to govern interaction
among the programs. Three models of expanded compensation for ill-
ness and injury are plausible: broader categorical subsistence protec-
tion, full subsistence protection, and full welfare protection. Each of
these loss-based models also carries with it implications for existing and
potential fault- and cause-based systems. Hence, we focus our analysis
not only on the scope of individual new or expanded programs, but
also on the relationships among the different components of the three
models.
The compensation system currently in force in this country can be
most accurately described as a collection of categorical subsistence pro-
grams. Compensation is categorical in the sense that it is provided to a
victim of illness or injury only if the victim fits within the category cov-
ered by a particular program. And with the exception of the tort sys-
tem, which at least in theory compensates all the losses victims have
94. For an argument that there is a rationale for the patchwork of social insurance
programs that evolved from the Social Security Act of 1935-programs that form a part,
but only a part, of the entire picture, see Theodore R. Marmor et al., America's
Misunderstood Welfare State (1990).
95. See supra note 4.
96. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
97. See the Black Lung Benefits Program, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1988), and
Veterans' Benefits, 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1988).
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suffered, virtually all compensation programs provide what amounts to
subsistence-level protection against the economic consequences of ill-
ness and injury. Small losses tend to be generously compensated, but
catastrophic losses receive only partial compensation.
The major gaps in this categorical subsistence protection result
from both of its features. Because the protection is categorical, a major
portion of the population-the working poor-does not have health
insurance. Moreover, individuals with even comparatively generous
health insurance are likely not to be fully insured against catastrophic
losses because of monetary ceilings on and exclusions from coverage.
Because most sources of disability insurance assure beneficiaries of
only subsistence, rarely is full income replaced in the event of disability.
Fault- and cause-based compensation schemes exhibit a kind of
ambivalence toward these gaps. On the one hand, these compensation
schemes have expanded, in part to fill the gaps in the system of loss
insurance. As we argued in Part II,98 in certain ways tort law has moved
beyond assuring corrective justice and deterrence in order to provide
compensation that would otherwise be unavailable or incompletely
available to the victims of severe injury and disease. Partly in reaction
to these expansions of the fault system, cause-based compensation pro-
grams have been developed to deal with particular classes of illness or
injury as these expansions of the fault system have become objectiona-
ble. For example, a rise in obstetrical malpractice claims brought about
the enactment of birth-related neurological defect compensation funds
in two states, 99 and the threatened disappearance of childhood vaccines
prompted the enactment of a federal vaccine side-effect compensation
program.' 0 0 On the other hand, the recent reversals of coverage pri-
orities (through modification of the collateral source rule) that render
loss-based insurance the primary source of coverage over fault- and
cause-based compensation serve to contract the scope of the latter
systems.
Thus, fault and causal systems appear to expand when loss insur-
ance is incompletely available and to contract when such insurance is
available. The extent of the expansion and contraction, however, varies
from state to state and with the type of fault- or cause-based compensa-
tion involved. The challenge posed for our first model for change is
how to bring greater principle and consistency into this system. The
challenge posed for any efforts that would go beyond this model is how
to build on the principle and consistency toward which the first model
would move.
1. Model I: Broader Categorical Subsistence. - Our first model would
restrict the expansion of tort law so that corrective justice and deter-
98. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 12.
100. See supra note 14.
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rence remain its predominant goals, and would regularize the expan-
sion of the current categorical subsistence approach. The model would
eliminate ad hoc expansions and contractions of fault- and cause-based
compensation and set priorities for expansion. We believe that provi-
sion of subsistence-level health care protection to the working poor
should be a high priority. This would extend protection to the individ-
uals who comprise the bulk of the thirty million people without health
insurance. 10 1 Assuring basic health care insurance at affordable rates
to everyone in the United States would thus be a principal task of
Model I.
Potential expansions of disability insurance programs might as-
sume any of four forms: protection against partial disability; protection
for the dependents of the disabled; protection for those whose disabil-
ity is partly the product of advancing age; and protection against tem-
porary disability.
a. Partial Disability. - By imposing the requirement of total disa-
bility, SSD and most private disability insurance programs do not pro-
vide compensation for partial disabilities-those that prevent a person
from engaging in a prior occupation but do not completely eliminate
that person's ability to work. This requirement makes eligibility a yes-
no question, with a claimant being found completely ineligible or fully
eligible. A substantial percentage of all applicants are near the border-
line of eligibility: something is wrong with them, perhaps they could
work with difficulty or pain, and while it is reasonable for society to
exempt them from further employment, others with similar difficulties
continue to work.
The requirement of total disability is a major cause of the dissatis-
faction with the outcomes of the vast adjudication system that labors to
make SSD eligibility decisions. Because an individual's application re-
quires such a subjective determination, and because so many of the
cases are near the yes-no line, every student of the system concludes
that outcomes depend on which decisionmaker sees a case, where in the
country an application is filed, and what words a physician may have
chosen to describe a condition. 10 2
A partial disability insurance system might alleviate some of the
difficulties associated with the SSD total-disability approach. Certainly,
the importance of decisions involving claimants on the borderline be-
tween total and partial disability would diminish under such a system.
However, a partial disability insurance system would face the daunting
administrative task of determining degrees of disability. In addition,
the cost of such a system is uncertain. As we noted above, the bulk of
101. See Congressional Research Serv., supra note 19, at 94.
102. For analyses of issues concerning the Social Security Disability program, see
Edward D. Berkowitz, Disabled Policy: America's Programs for the Handicapped
79-104 (1987); Mashaw, supra note 41, at 21-46; Deborah A. Stone, The Disabled State
3-14 (1984); Liebman, supra note 5, at 836-55 (1976).
110 [Vol. 93:75
1993] COMPENSATION FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 111
workers' compensation payments are made to compensate permanent
partial disabilities. It is likely that a program to compensate for non-
work-related permanent partial disabilities would be correspondingly
expensive, at least in part because of the various moral hazards associ-
ated with disability insurance of any sort.
b. Compensation for Minor Dependents of the Disabled. - In a sense,
existing disability insurance programs already provide compensation to
all the minor dependents of the disabled by replacing a portion of the
income lost by those who had supported the dependents in the past. It
would be a relatively simple matter to adapt the current Social Security
Survivors program to replace more of the lost earnings of deceased
providers.10 3 It would be much more difficult, however, to expand it
into, or to add, a program providing replacement income for children
when a parent remains alive but disabled in some way that reduces the
support available to the child. Providing adequate support for the child
in such a situation would almost certainly require transferring funds to
the parent directly. Yet at that point it Wvould be hard to see the pro-
gram as anything other than a minimum income for the young (or, in
European parlance, a "children's allowance"), but without a rationale
for the provision of such an allowance only to children of the disabled
rather than to all children in need.
c. Disability Resulting from Advancing Age. - The magnitude of the
problem of disability resulting from advanced age has been a major
force behind the decisions in both the United States and Europe to
103. In marked contrast to other developed nations, the United States has no
program that provides a minimum income to each child. The most important program
providing income to dependents that currently exists in the United States is represented
by the "S" in OASDHI (Social Security). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1988). It makes
income-support payments to "survivors" of a deceased person who had achieved
eligibility. See id. § 402. The payments are based on the earnings of the late worker
(normally a parent or a spouse), and are made until a minor survivor reaches age 18.
See id. § 402(d). The program pays over $35 billion in benefits each year. See
Statistical Abstract, supra note 9, at 360.
Because survivor benefits, like OASDHI payments to the aged and the disabled, are
determined by a progressive formula (replacing a large percentage of smaller incomes
and a smaller percentage of larger incomes) and because there are no benefits for wages
above the maximum ($51,000 in 1990), this program is relatively adequate wage-loss
replacement for spouses and children of those with low incomes and a much less
complete replacement for dependents of those earning more. For discussion of this
program and of policy issues concerning benefit levels and taxes, see Martha Derthick,
Policymaking for Social Security (1979); Theodore R. Marmor &Jerry L. Mashaw, Social
Security: Beyond the Rhetoric of Crisis (1988); Alicia H. Munnell, The Future of Social
Security (1977). Concerning the benefits provided through the Social Security system to
surviving children, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Children's Benefits in Social Security, 65
Cornell L. Rev. 836 (1980). Because of its relevance to issues of gender fairness, there
has been more literature about "derivative" Social Security benefits for surviving
spouses. See, e.g., Grace G. Blumberg, Adult Derivative Benefits in Social Security, 32
Stan. L. Rev. 233, 233-92 (1980); Peter W. Martin, Social Security Benefits for Spouses,
63 Cornell L. Rev. 789, 789-840 (1978).
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limit public disability benefits to only the most compelling claimants. 104
As a general matter, it is immensely difficult to apply the concept of a
disabling illness or injury to individuals who are declining in capacity
and energy, especially when the workplace is changing because of new
technology and the capacities of younger workers. Some individuals
beyond age fifty also have difficulty adapting to new types of work and
being selected for vacant positions. Any compensation initiative di-
rected at this phenomenon would have to separate those to whom
something compensable has occurred from those who are merely tired
or not as able as they were formerly.10 5 A disability insurance program
directed at those suffering disabling illness and injury would therefore
have implications for society's policy toward those whose jobs
disappear. 106
104. For good historical accounts of the attitudes of those who added disability
protection to the U.S. Social Security system in the 1950s, the growth in the number of
recipients to levels beyond those predicted, the legislative effort by the Carter
administration to remove from the rolls those no longer eligible, and the political
firestorm that erupted when the Reagan administration sought to implement the 1980
statutory amendments, see Berkowitz, supra note 102, at 61-78, 106-43; Lance
Liebman & Richard B. Stewart, Bureaucratic Vision, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1952, 1955-56
(1983) (reviewingJerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice (1983)).
Of course, there is already in place a very substantial income maintenance program
for the elderly. The "OA" (for "old age") in OASDHI is a vast program making $157
billion in payments each year to retired persons. See Statistical Abstract, supra note 9,
at 360. Benefits are a formulaic replacement keyed to covered wages during the final
years of work. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1988). In addition, the old-age segment of the
Supplemental Security Income program provides a minimum income to the elderly
poor; to be eligible an individual must have very little income and few assets. This
program pays approximately $3 billion per year. See Committee on Ways and Means,
102d Cong., 2d Sess., Overview of Entitlement Programs (1992 Green Book) 823
(1992).
105. This is the reason for the dramatic growth since World War II, in the United
States and Europe, in the percentages of persons above age 50 leaving the workforce
and seeking disability benefits. Given improving levels of health, the growth of disability
claimants is anomalous. Explanations include the availability of income transfer
benefits, evolving social norms (how much pain should an individual bear, for example),
and rapidly changing technology.
106. See Virginia P. Reno & Daniel N. Price, Relationship Between the Retirement,
Disability, and Unemployment Insurance Programs: The U.S. Experience, Soc. Security
Bull., May 1985, at 24. Pursuant to a federal statute, all states administer
Unemployment Insurance programs. See id. at 26. These provide roughly $15 billion
per year in income replacement benefits, paid as a percentage of prior salary up to a
maximum, to individuals who have become involuntarily unemployed after establishing
eligibility by an adequate period of covered employment. In all states eligibility is for 26
weeks and in some states it continues for 39 weeks. See id. at 27. To maintain
eligibility, an individual must be available for work and accept a suitable job if one is
offered.
States vary widely in their evaluations of reasons for leaving work. In some states,
good personal reasons-a sick relative, the desire to follow a friend to another city-
make a departure involuntary. In other states, resigning rather than being dismissed
usually results in ineligibility for Unemployment Insurance benefits. See Saul J.
Blaustein, Job and Income Security for Unemployed Workers (1981) (discussing and
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d. Temporary Disability. - In five states, government programs pay
benefits to persons medically disabled for a temporary period. 10 7 In
addition, sick leave is a largely unregulated system of temporary disa-
bility insurance, subject to the discretion of employers and, where ap-
plicable, collective bargaining. It would be possible to expand these
programs into a general compensation scheme offering payments to all
who do not work for a period of time and whose nonwork is socially
approved.10 8 Such a program might compensate those medically un-
able to work; those who lost jobs under circumstances not regarded as
their "fault" and who do not have new jobs; and those not working
because of pregnancy or the need to care for elderly parents ("family
leave" 109).
Our own view is that from an insurance standpoint, such a pro-
gram should receive relatively low priority among the alternatives that
might be adopted." 10 Temporary disabilities are by definition less cata-
strophic than permanent disabilities and therefore less sensible to in-
sure against than the latter. Indeed, the absence of such coverage can
be considered a kind of deductible or self-insurance requirement of ex-
isting permanent disability compensation devices. Sick leave is a popu-
lar fringe benefit, perhaps in part because it is the kind of insurance
which many, rather than just a few beneficiaries, actually recover. But
this is precisely the reason that this form of coverage should be a low
priority for inclusion in a universal disability insurance program-
short-term disability is less a risk than an expected and fairly predict-
able loss.
The advantage of a temporary disability compensation program,
however, would be its capacity partially to fill certain gaps now plugged
by the tort and cause-based systems of compensation. The new pro-
gram would identify those out of work for less than six months, select
those among them who should be barred from receiving benefits (for
example, those whose behavior at work was egregious), and compen-
sate all others to an appropriate extent. The cost could be met either
by a payroll tax or by mandated benefits from employers. The major
evaluating state programs); Paul L. Burgess & Jerry L. Kingston, An Incentives
Approach to Improving the Unemployment Compensation System (1987) (same);
Walter Corson et al., Nonmonetary Eligibility in State Unemployment Insurance
Programs: Law and Practice 1-10 (1986) (same).
107. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
108. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Short Term Paid Leave: A New Approach to Social
Insurance and Employee Benefits, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 465, 465-66 (1987) (offering the
outlines of such a program, with benefits of one day of sick leave for every eight days of
work). Currently, about two-thirds of American medium- and large-size firms offer sick
leave. See Statistical Abstract, supra note 9, at 420.
109. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
110. We set aside here the separate question whether, for reasons of gender equity
or other social policies, compensation for pregnancy or family leave should receive a
higher priority than we would accord it for purely insurance purposes.
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issues in designing the new program would include how to relate the
compensation level to prior income; how to supervise work searches,
and what standards to adopt for reviewing refusals of work; how to es-
tablish a benefit structure that would provide economic incentives to
take a job; and whether payments should be made only for an arbitrar-
ily fixed period, as is the case under the current unemployment insur-
ance program. But the fundamental and most difficult question would
be whether only sub-groups of those in need should be compensated.
If individuals who worked and lost their jobs due to injury, illness, or
reduced demand for their kind of labor are eligible, why not include
those who have never been lucky enough to have a job?
2. Model II: Full Subsistence. - A second model would expand loss
insurance beyond the broader categorical subsistence described above
by assuring full subsistence protection to the entire American popula-
tion. In connection with illness and injury, the major additional
changes required would be the provision of catastrophic health insur-
ance to the thirty million or more individuals who are now uninsured
and the roughly similar number who have limited health insurance, and
the expansion of total disability insurance to assure that persons suffer-
ing such disability were assured of subsistence-level income in the
event of their inability to work. This is a simple enough expansion to
describe, although as we indicated earlier, it would be politically and
economically difficult to implement. Setting aside these difficulties,
however, some of the most interesting issues this model poses involve
the roles that would be played by fault- and cause-based compensation
systems.
The first issue would be whether use of fault- and cause-based sys-
tems for corrective justice and deterrence purposes should continue.
On the one hand, nothing in a societal decision to assure that the vic-
tims of illness and injury receive subsistence-level protection would
preclude the effort to achieve either of these other goals through fault-
and cause-based systems. On the other hand, the requirements of
these goals might change as universal loss insurance lost its initial sta-
tus as a newly acquired individual asset and evolved into a characteristic
of residency in the United States. For example, we might cease to con-
sider the negligent infliction of the economic costs of illness and injury
(such as health care expenses or lost wages) to be a wrong requiring
corrective justice through the imposition of tort liability, since such
costs would be automatically insured. In effect, these expenses would
no longer be considered personal losses, because they would be auto-
matically reimbursed. This change in attitude might suggest complete
repeal of the collateral source rule in tort law as it applies to subsis-
tence-level loss insurance," I though the rule might be retained as ap-
111. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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plied to voluntarily purchased private insurance against losses above
subsistence level.
From a deterrence perspective, however, the issue would be more
complicated. Because the economic costs of accidents are real even
when they are fully insured, it would be rational to deter those acci-
dents worth deterring even under a full-subsistence system. Retention
of this goal would require application of the traditional collateral
source rule in tort law and its analogues in cause-based systems.
Otherwise, the parties paying the claims under these systems would not
be held responsible for the full cost of the losses they had caused. In-
terestingly, then, although corrective justice concerns might become
weak enough to permit the partial withering away of the fault- and
cause-based systems under a full-subsistence model, deterrence con-
cerns might require these systems to continue in the same forms they
have taken in the past. And since a compensation gap with respect to
above-subsistence losses would remain, the current tendency to employ
fault- and cause-based systems to fill part of this gap would probably
persist.
3. Model III: Full Welfare. - Our vision of a full-welfare system of
compensation for the consequences of illness and injury consists of
full-subsistence protection plus one other component: relatively "full"
insurance against economic loss resulting from both total and partial
disability, up to a fairly high ceiling-for example, insurance that would
fully replace the lost income of all but the top 10% of American wage
earners, subject to a coinsurance provision designed to mitigate moral
hazard. In describing this model as a "welfare" scheme, we do not
mean to suggest that it would be governmentally operated, that the
health and disability benefits provided to the middle and upper classes
should not be financed entirely by these classes, or that the financing
scheme should not be income-redistributional. On the contrary, we ex-
pect that the political and economic conditions that would make any
such scheme possible would require self-financing by these classes and
include a heavy element of redistribution to those with lower incomes.
The major implication for the fault- and cause-based systems of the
adoption of a full welfare system would be the elimination of virtually
all need to employ these systems in order to fill compensation gaps.
Full-welfare loss insurance would assure nearly full compensation for
the consequences of illness and injury. In turn, fault- and cause-based
systems would be designed exclusively to promote corrective justice
and deterrence, but only to the extent that these goals persisted and
only to the extent that these systems could be effectively used to pro-
mote these goals.
Since most economic losses would be covered by a combination of
private and social insurance, tort liability might be imposed only in
cases of severe wrongdoing or in the limited number of situations in
which noneconomic losses cried out for compensation. In effect, there
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would be high thresholds of harm and blame below which causes of
action in tort would normally be abolished. With occasional excep-
tions, it might then be preferable to pursue deterrence of recurring in-
jury or illness through more easily administrable cause-based
compensation systems, financed by the parties largely responsible for
these losses. The reason for imposing fault- or cause-based liability,
then, would ordinarily have little to do with the provision of compensa-
tion for economic loss, since loss insurance would already be available
to perform this function. Rather, the fault- and cause-based systems
would exist almost exclusively to right severe wrongs and to influence
future behavior. Therefore, as in the full-subsistence system we de-
scribed above,1 12 in order to perform these functions, each fault- and
cause-based system would have to be a primary source of coverage
whenever its jurisdiction was triggered. A version of the traditional col-
lateral source rule in tort and its equivalent in the causal systems would
be applied, 113 and responsible parties would be directly liable to the
loss insurance system for all losses paid or payable to the victim by that
system.
Interestingly, this approach might begin the transformation of the
fault and causal systems into little more than cost-accounting mecha-
nisms. Concern for administrative efficiency would dictate that the loss
insurance system bundle its claims for economic losses against
tortfeasors and process them collectively against these parties' liability
insurers, except in cases in which detailed fact-finding was necessary.
Processing of claims compensable in the causal systems would be even
more collective and clerical, for disputes over coverage and the need
for fact-finding would be even rarer here than in the case of claims
compensable in tort. Only in cases in which an individual was entitled
to pursue a claim for compensable pain and suffering might tort claims
continue to exist.
In short, under a full-welfare system, conventional tort liability
would not be abolished. But it might slowly wither away, as the de-
mands of corrective justice declined in the face of socially provided in-
surance against the economic consequences of injury and disease. The
liability that remained would be imposed almost exclusively for the pur-
poses of deterrence, under circumstances that would resemble the allo-
cation of expenses among different components of a conglomerate
business, not the adjudication of civil liability.
CONCLUSION
It is time for the United States to develop a coherent system for
compensating the victims of illness and injury. This system need not be
based exclusively on principle; cost is certainly an appropriate concern,
112. See supra part III.B.2.
113. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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as is the difficulty of making the transition from the series of categorical
compensation programs that have grown up independently. But as the
boundaries of these programs have reached toward and actually over-
lapped each other, the justifications for their independence have weak-
ened. The programs are no longer normatively or even logically
independent, since many of the arguments for the very existence and
character of any particular program depend on the existence and char-
acter of the others.
In our view, the necessary first step is to assure basic health care
insurance to the entire population. It is difficult to justify a set of pro-
grams that assures the middle class and the very poor basic health care
and compensates the victims of tortious, work-related, and auto acci-
dents for their health care expenses, but denies the working poor full
access to health care unless their needs fall fortuitously into one of the
foregoing categories. Although providing such insurance will not be
inexpensive, some of the additional cost will be more apparent than
real. The uninsured currently receive some care from public and non-
profit hospitals. Some savings could be generated by incorporating
more effective measures to contain the cost of health care provided to
the already-insured population, and the extension of preventive care to
those who are now uninsured could result in long-run savings in health
care costs and increased national productivity.
A second step would require addressing the disability insurance
gap. This is admittedly a more substantial challenge, because adverse
selection, moral hazard, and other factors that impede the effective
functioning of disability insurance cannot be completely combatted.
The rationale for a program providing compensation for disability-re-
lated losses but not for other misfortunes is also open to question. Are
the disabled any more deserving of compensation than, for example,
those who have become homeless because of unemployment? As a
"system" for compensating the victims of illness and injury in this
country emerges, therefore, it will have to be harmonized with broader
policies toward social welfare in general. Nonetheless, if for no other
reason than the high priority we almost automatically accord to reliev-
ing physical suffering, compensation of the disabled for the losses con-
sequent to their disability should follow the provision of basic health
care to the American population.
Once a system containing these elements of compensation is devel-
oped, the role of the tort system in compensating the victims of illness
and injury could be de-emphasized. Because compensation for health
care expenses and lost income would already be assured independently
of the tort system, the desirability of providing compensation for these
losses through tort recoveries would substantially decline. Tort law
could return to its traditional role of assuring corrective justice and de-
terrence, and what corrective justice required by way of compensation
might even decline, since compensation for out-of-pocket health care
1993]
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expenses and wage losses would already be provided to all who in-
curred those costs, regardless of their cause. Tort law would thus be-
come an even more ancillary feature of the constellation of American
compensation programs than it is at present.
Although we are not sanguine about the immediate prospects for
the emergence of a full-blown compensation "system" in this country,
the recent presidential campaign debate about health insurance pro-
vides considerable evidence that a new era may be beginning, in which
the scope of previously obscure compensation programs is a continuing
political issue, and the unsystematic character of these programs a mat-
ter of public concern. Public recognition of these issues may not be a
sufficient condition for change to occur, but it certainly is a necessary
condition. With the additional ingredient of informed analysis from a
variety of quarters, we may find it possible to move toward a new vision
of compensation for illness and injury in the United States.
